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INTRODUCTION
Environmental policy conflicts used to be predictable. Environmental
advocacy groups battled with regulated industries in courthouses and
legislatures (federal and state), and governments were stuck in the middle.1
But the emergence of complex problems, such as climate change, and of
* Larson Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. The author would like
to thank Amy Sinden, Michael Livermore, Arden Rowell, and Dean Kevin R. Johnson, for their help
and comments, as well as those offering me comments at the Sixth Annual Society for Environmental
Law and Economics Meeting. The author is also indebted to Robin Phillips, Kevin Alford, and the
Florida State University Library staff for their research assistance. All errors are those of the author
alone.
1. See, e.g., JOHN OPIE, NATURE’S NATION: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 448 (1998) (“Too often, it appeared, EPA’s bureaucracy moved toward regulatory gridlock as it
tried to appease the conflicting interests of environmentalists, industry, technological viability, and
scientific certainty.”).
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mixed-blessing technologies, such as hydraulic fracturing and genetic
engineering, combined with the two decades of congressional inaction on
federal environmental legislation, has created new schisms in
environmental law and policy. New law- and policy-making conflicts are
pitting traditional allies against each other. The Environmental Defense
Fund (EDF), one of the oldest environmental advocacy organizations in the
world, is now scorned by upstart environmental groups for often breaking
policy ranks.2 Harvard Law Professor Cass Sunstein, who served as
President Obama’s head of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, left government service to a chorus of praise from political
conservatives,3 while being roundly criticized by politically liberal
organizations4 and also by his former student, fellow Democrat and Obama
2. See, e.g., CHRISTINE MACDONALD, GREEN, INC.: AN ENVIRONMENTAL INSIDER REVEALS
HOW A GOOD CAUSE HAS GONE BAD xv–xvi (2008) (“ED[F] likes to call itself nature’s lawyer, but
ED[F]’s longtime president Fred Krupp is seen more as corporate America’s most effective mediator on
environmental questions . . . . [EDF] has conducted “projects” aimed at greening such companies as
Federal Express, S. C. Johnson, and DuPont that critics say have allowed those companies to greenwash
their images . . . . There is plenty of evidence, however, that the companies are getting more out of the
current setup than the endangered species.”); see also Steve Horn, New Shill Gas Study Published by
SUNY Buffalo Institute With Heavy Industry Ties, DESMOGBLOG (May 17, 2012, 14:19),
http://www.desmogblog.com/new-shill-gas-study-published-suny-buffalo-institute-heavy-industry-ties
(citations omitted) (“Digging deeper, the Buffalo study also had a Peer Review panel. That panel had
five reviewers, four of five of which have ties to the oil and gas industry: . . . Scott Anderson is the
senior policy advisor with the [EDF’s] Energy Program. As covered previously on DeSmogBlog,
Anderson formerly worked in the oil and gas industry and is a former executive vice president and
general counsel for the Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association. He is also a
member of the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, which opposes extending the federal Safe
Drinking Water Act to hydraulic fracturing.”). More recently, EDF supported a toxics regulation reform
bill championed by the late Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) and Senator David Vitter (R-La.), but
was strongly opposed by other environmental organizations and a number of environmental law
professors. Jeremy P. Jacobs, Advocates Rally Opposition to TSCA Reform Compromise Bill, E&E
DAILY (June 12, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/eedaily/2013/06/12/stories/1059982693.
3. Sunstein’s admirers include the conservative U.S. Chamber of Commerce. John McArdle
& Emily Yehle, Controversial Regulatory Chief Leaves Administration, GREENWIRE (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059968392. They also include Congressman Darrell Issa, the California
Republican who has made it his calling to lambaste the Obama Administration. See, e.g., id. (“House
Oversight and Government Reform Chairman Darrell Issa (R-Calif.), who has repeatedly criticized
Obama for what he sees as over-regulation and made it a centerpiece of his panel’s agenda, singled out
Sunstein as enlightened.”); Mark Leibovich, Republican Emerges as Obama’s Annoyer-in-Chief, N.Y.
TIMES (July 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/us/politics/07issa.html?ref=darrellissa&_r=0
(“‘You can call me a pain,’ Mr. Issa said. ‘I’ll accept that as a compliment.’”).
4. See, e.g., McArdle & Yehle, supra note 3 (“[B]oth Public Citizen and the Center for
Progressive Reform came close to celebrating Sunstein’s departure, calling it an ‘opportunity’ for the
Obama administration to drop the regulatory-reform agenda.”); Rena Steinzor, Fiddling While Rome
Burns 64 Dead, 741 Sick, and Cass Sunstein’s Dangerous Love Affair With Cost-Benefit Analysis, CTR.
FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM BLOG (Dec. 10, 2013), http://progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=
DDAD4C84-DA1D-D073-EFF093E52BB4972C (“So, for example, in their number-crunching frenzy,
Sunstein and his fellow cost-benefit enthusiasts value the loss of an IQ point because a child is exposed
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Administration official, Georgetown law professor Lisa Heinzerling.5
While partisan politics have reinforced some traditional political divides,
these new disagreements seem to represent the drawing of new fault lines.
And the rhetoric has been so heated that these arguments among former
allies have at times bordered on the fratricidal.6 What is going on?
This Article argues that the nature of environmental policy conflict is
changing and that a new kind of opposition movement is forming.
Congressional gridlock on environmental policy7 has not stalled
environmental lawmaking but has instead pushed it into the administrative
realm. This change in venue has produced new reform proposals, along
with new suspicions. Reformers have sought to inject more quantitative
indices into lawmaking, and the new opposition has voiced doubts about
whether these quantitative measures represent more objectivity or false
objectivity. At the same time, the complexity of some new environmental
to lead paint or lead in drinking water at somewhere between $1,500-$8,400. This number is then
discounted at the rate of seven percent annually to reflect that although children might be poisoned
today, the damage won’t affect their earning power until they reach the age of majority. Never mind the
affliction of going through all of one’s life with a brain diminished from what it should be . . . . In the
end, cost-benefit analysis seems best suited for satisfying the intellectual musings of someone safely
ensconced in an Ivory Tower, high above and far removed from the very real dangers that agencies such
as the FDA are tasked with addressing. We’d all be a lot safer if agencies were able to go about their
business unfettered by the fruitless search for more information geared to support various dogmas.”).
5. See Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 325–26 (2013)
(criticizing the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ review of the EPA’s regulatory output).
6. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341, 2366
(2002) (“At the end of the day, one is left with a pressing need to know why a person with Professor
Sunstein’s obvious intelligence and even disposition would conclude that all of this occasionally
comprehensible, but frequently preposterous and always manipulable number spinning, could possibly
lead to better decisionmaking in the real world.”); see also Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90
GEO. L.J. 2311, 2313 (2002) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic] (citations omitted)
(“[Professor Sunstein] claims that the dollar benefits of the arsenic rule plausibly range from zero to half
a billion. Undaunted by this astonishingly wide range, Sunstein argues that cost-benefit analysis is
useful to decisionmakers because it helps them to escape the grip of “intuitive toxicologists” (that is,
those of us who are not experts in matters of risk) . . . .”); see also FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA
HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 45
(2000) (“[A]nalysts—including economist Randall Lutter, of the American Enterprise Institute—are
busily working to show that EPA got it wrong when it looked at the economics of banning leaded
gasoline almost two decades ago.”). Ackerman and Heinzerling later state:
Perhaps the most striking criticism . . . came from Robert Stavins, a well-known
environmental economist . . . . His comments to EPA represented a dramatic
reversal of his past views . . . By 2002, . . . Stavins was consulting for Pacific Gas
& Electric, the giant California energy company that starred opposite Julia
Roberts in the movie Erin Brockovich. His cautions from the 1980s about the
limits of cost-benefit analysis were long since forgotten . . . .
Id. at 174–75.
7. In this author’s view, the last significant reform being the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified in section of 42 U.S.C.).
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challenges has partisans coping with their ignorance with reflexive
skepticism and instinctive hostility to proxy enemies. Arguments over
climate change, hydraulic fracturing, and the genetic modification of foods
have each generated a good deal more heat than light, in part because solid
conclusions have remained elusive. Into these knowledge vacuums have
rushed a new genre of mass campaigns, polemics of suspicion taking full
advantage of the dissemination powers of the internet.8
I consider this new kind of opposition postmodern in nature because it
has sought to undermine the legitimacy of lawmaking by arguing that it
generates outcomes that are structurally and inherently biased. A
fundamental postmodern objection is that neutral institutions are not really
neutral at all but are hidden power grabs. The primary fear of this new form
of opposition in environmental law, which I label the environmental
postmodernists, is that changes are afoot by which special interest groups
seek to gerrymander environmental law to their private advantage, and to
the detriment of public health and the environment. Environmental
postmodernists urge us to take a skeptical look at the claims of reformers. I
call them accidental postmodernists because they make no claim that their
opposition is postmodernist at all; they likely do not consider themselves
postmodernist. Some environmental postmodernists are climate skeptics,
challenging climate scientists that warn of the dangers of global climate
change.9 Some of these industry-funded and Koch Brothers-funded groups10
8. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Fracking’s Achilles’ Heel, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/19/opinion/nocera-frackings-achilles-heel.html (noting suspicion
about hydraulic fracturing). For example:
Shortly after [Colorado Governor] Hickenlooper announced the proposed rules in
a press conference, I called Sam Schabacker, the Mountain West regional director
for a group called Food and Water Watch. He hadn’t yet read the proposed rules,
but that didn’t stop him. These new rules were just a “smoke screen,” he said,
designed to fool the public. E.D.F. was giving industry “a veneer of
respectability.” Then he added, “We believe that fracking is inherently unsafe and
should be banned.”
Id. On the emotional nature of genetically modified foods, see, for example, Amy Harmon, A Lonely
Quest for Facts on Genetically Modified Crops, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/01/05/us/on-hawaii-a-lonely-quest-for-facts-about-gmos.html (“Public hearings were dominated
by recitations of the ills often attributed to genetically modified organisms, or G.M.O.s: cancer in rats, a
rise in childhood allergies, out-of-control superweeds, genetic contamination, overuse of pesticides, the
disappearance of butterflies and bees.”). On climate change, see discussion infra Part II.C.
9. See discussion infra Part II.C.
10. The Koch brothers, billionaire fossil fuel company owners, have donated generously to a
number of groups with an aggressive agenda centered on sowing skepticism and doubt about the science
of climate change. See, e.g., Eric Holmberg & Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Koch Climate Pledge
Strategy Continues to Grow, INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING WORKSHOP (July 1, 2013),
http://investigativereportingworkshop.org/investigations/the_koch_club/story/Koch_climate_pledge_str
ategy/ (“Staffers from some Koch-funded nonprofit groups have continued to testify before Congress,
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would seem to have little in common with the likes of the liberal Center for
Progressive Reform.11 But these strange bedfellows sometimes share an
unmistakably postmodern mode of objection: to sow skepticism.
In particular, environmental postmodernists have rallied around
opposition to the use of cost-benefit analysis in environmental law and
around a discomfort with the way that science is produced and used in
environmental policy. What emerges from environmental postmodernist
opposition in these two very different policy arenas is a shared skepticism
of a narrative that seems to be gaining a dominant position. For those
nervous about cost-benefit analysis, every piece of policy seems to be
animated by a curiously opaque cost-benefit analysis. For those distraught
over a perceived misuse of science in public policy, suspect “policyrelevant” science12 generated under suspicious conditions, seems to usurp a
variety of other relevant (but less objective-sounding) considerations.
Lacking adequate access to policy-relevant science, disenfranchised
scientists turn postmodernist.
When environmental postmodernists resist change, a secondary
motivation suggests itself: self-preservation. When environmental
postmodernists on the left, composed mostly of lawyers and law professors,
argue for a return to environmental law the way it has been traditionally
practiced, it reflects a fear that reform may render them less relevant to lawand policy-making. Many reforms or changes devolve environmental
decision-making to actors other than lawyers, such that much
environmental law- and policy-making is made beyond the legal realm.
Cost-benefit analyses, which can have an enormous impact on a proposed
rulemaking, elevate the importance of economists and diminish the role of
lawyers. Market-based reforms, like cap-and-trade, rob lawyers of
thousands of billable hours litigating legal issues like the meaning of
“routine maintenance, repair and replacement,”13 and deprive lawyers and
sowing doubt about climate change . . . .”); Robert J. Brulle, Institutionalizing Delay Foundation
Funding and the Creation of U.S. Climate Change Counter-Movement Organizations, 122 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 68182 (2014) (discussing the funding of organizations contesting the need for climate change
policy).
11. See, e.g., John McArdle, Progressives Bang Drums for Course Correction’ at White
House Reg Office, GREENWIRE (May 16, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059981294 (referring to
Rena Steinzor as “president of the left-leaning Center for Progressive Reform”).
12. Policy-relevant science is distinguished from basic science in its unique relevance to a
specific question of public policy. See infra notes 154–58 and accompanying text.
13. A “modification” to a facility regulated under § 111 of the Clean Air Act will trigger a
requirement that the facility obtain a permit from EPA or a state permitting agency prior to commencing
construction. Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2012). However, if the facility can establish
that the modification is merely “[r]outine maintenance, repair, and replacement,” then it is exempt from
permitting requirements. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2011). The terms have been a fertile source of litigation.
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law professors of the opportunity to write about it.14 Understandably,
environmental lawyers are reluctant to cede their historical domain to social
scientists and other Johnny-come-latelies. But when environmental lawyers
try to corral environmental law- and policy-making back onto their own
turf, they are vulnerable to the same kinds of criticism that they levy against
others: They are only out to grab (or preserve) power. Environmental
postmodernists open themselves up, ironically, to postmodern critiques.
Self-preservation aside, do environmental postmodernists nevertheless
have a point? Reform efforts are indeed often ideological, and nakedly so,
providing environmental postmodernists with convenient targets. But it is
possible for environmental postmodernists to prove too much.
Postmodernist skepticism has the effect of raising the burden of proof,
translating negative circumstantial evidence into smoking guns. There is
also something unsatisfying with a mode of thought that is reflexively
skeptical, casting a negative pall over discourse, while offering little
positive guidance.
Some environmental postmodernists have avoided this negativity trap
that has ensnared the traditional, French, “post-structural” postmodernists.15
Some have argued for a “pragmatic reorientation” of policy analysis that is
more in keeping with the notion of the policy professional as
multidisciplinary mediator of diverse stakeholders.16 Some environmental
postmodernists have proposed alternatives that truly seek to broaden
process inputs rather than achieve outcomes. Principled postmodernists can
really only support this kind of solution. Broadening the process inputs to

See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, The Real Problem With New Source Review, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10095, 10100
(2006) (describing litigation that has resulted from attempts to define terms in the Clean Air Act).
14. See, e.g., Robert R. Nordhaus, Modernizing the Clean Air Act Is There Life After 40?, 33
ENERGY L.J. 365, 374–75 (2012); Daniel E. Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy
Administrative Law Against Political Control, 28 J.L. & POL. 129, 151 (2013); Thomas O. McGarity,
When Strong Enforcement Works Better Than Weak Regulation, 72 MD. L. REV, 1204, 1205–06, 1276,
1281 (2013) (claiming that environmental regulations are either deterrence-based or assistance-based; in
deterrence-based regulation, regulatees are pure economic actors, while in assistance-based regulation,
regulatees can be trusted to err on the compliance side in statutory interpretation); see also New York v.
EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing attempts to redefine the meaning of “[r]outine
maintenance, repair, and replacement”); United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 850–51
(S.D. Ohio 2003) (attempting to redefine the meaning of “‘routine maintenance, repair, and
replacement’”).
15. Post-structural postmodernism is commonly thought of as the strand of postmodern thought
that is most pronounced in its skepticism of grand assertions as power plays, and its dogmatic insistence
on the instability of knowledge and meaning. Its tenets form a set of core beliefs for most
postmodernists. See, e.g., MADAN SARUP, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO POST-STRUCTURALISM AND
POSTMODERNISM 1–4 (Univ. of Ga. Press, 2d ed. 1993).
16. Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis A
Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 433–34 (2008).

2014]

The Accidental Postmodernists

33

law and policy development is power diffusion, and is the only kind of
proposal that could survive the cynically postmodernist complaint that the
purpose of every change in rules is a power grab.
Part I of this Article will describe postmodernism and its influence in
legal thought. Part II examines a live and persistent controversy in an area
in which environmental reform has met with opposition from
environmental postmodernists: the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in
environmental law. This Part also considers the evolving role of science in
environmental law- and policy-making, and postmodern themes that are
raised in public discourse, including those raised by climate skeptics in
opposing the prevailing message of climate scientists. Part III of this Article
offers a critical evaluation of the environmental postmodernist objection
and a synthesis with what appears to be a positivist trend in environmental
law- and policy-making. Part IV concludes with some summary remarks
and observations on future trends and counter-trends in environmental law.
I. WHAT IS POSTMODERNISM?
Postmodernism is hard to define, even for postmodernists,17 in part
because postmodernism is best understood as opposition to something, or
skepticism towards a proposition, rather than itself an idea.18 Postmodernist
scholars differ, but fundamentally postmodernists pose definitional
challenges to authority and power. The postmodernist philosopher JeanFrancois Lyotard defined the “postmodern condition” as “incredulity

17. See, e.g., Dietmar Voss & Jochen C. Schutze, Postmodernism in Context Perspectives of a
Structural Change in Society, Literature, and Literary Criticism, 47 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 119, 119
(1989) (“The participants in the discussion seem to agree on one thing: that there is the greatest possible
disagreement as to what postmodernism is. The term itself is unspecific, unsuitable to express the selfunderstanding of an era. It resists comprehensive definition and appears, at the same time, to accept
content so arbitrary that some commentators are deluded into regarding this arbitrariness itself as an
essential characteristic of postmodernism.”).
18. To some extent, defining postmodernism is oxymoronic, since a basic tenet of
postmodernism is that attempts to generalize and describe are inherently biased by cultural specificities
of the observer. Postmodernists are generally skeptical of pronouncements of truth and attempts to
discern truth. See, e.g., TIM WOODS, BEGINNING POSTMODERNISM 9 (2d ed. 2009) (“Whereas
philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel . . . placed a great deal
of faith in a human’s ability to reason . . . [,] postmodernism is an attack on reason.”). For example,
while postmodernist scholar Jean Francois Lyotard defines postmodern as “incredulity towards
metanarratives,” JEAN FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION, at xxiv (Geoff Bennington
& Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984) (1979), Fredric Jameson, a Marxist and
postmodernist, rejects the view that postmodernist theories are necessarily atomistic and insusceptible of
generalization. FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM 3
(1991) (“[T]heories of the postmodern . . . bear a strong family resemblance to all those more ambitious
sociological generalizations . . . .”).
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towards metanarratives”—overgeneralizations that try to prove too much.19
As such, postmodernists have generally resisted Kantianism, Hegelianism,
and Marxism, all grand theories that take a progressive view of history, that
knowledge can liberate and that all knowledge has a secret unity.20 This
skepticism has pervaded several fields of study, establishing lasting
footholds in fields such as architecture,21 art,22 literature,23 music,24 and
education.25 In law, postmodernism has spawned the rise of Critical Legal
Studies, Critical Race Theory, and other “Crits.”26 At bottom,
postmodernists are skeptical of any claims of objectivity or broad
generality.
Jean-Francois Lyotard took particular exception to science, arguing
that scientists were not really engaged in an objective pursuit of truth, but in
a self-serving verification of their own research.27 The scientific method, in
Lyotard’s view, was little more than a quest to confirm the correctness of
hypotheses, which themselves are products of social structures and biases.28
But Lyotard’s work is only an extension of the work of another, larger
postmodernist figure: his contemporary, French philosopher Michel
Foucault. Foucault’s early defining work, The History of Madness in the
Classical Age,29 a product of his painstaking research in Parisian mental
hospitals, is a damning critique of a medical profession that had classified
homosexuality as a “‘mental illness.’”30 Later, in Discipline and Punish,31
19. LYOTARD, supra note 18, at xxiv.
20. CHRISTOPHER BUTLER, POSTMODERNISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 13 (2002).
21. Id. at 89–91.
22. Id. at 62–68.
23. Id. at 69–73.
24. Id. at 73–76.
25. PAULINE MARIE ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS,
INROADS, AND INTRUSIONS 49 (1992).
26. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 5 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 2d ed. 2011) (“[Critical
Race Theory] also draws from certain European philosophers and theorists, such as Antonio Gramsci,
Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida . . . . From critical legal studies, the group borrowed the idea of
legal indeterminacy . . . .”).
27. See LYOTARD, supra note 18, at 46 (“Scientists, technicians, and instruments are purchased
not to find truth, but to augment power.”).
28. See id. at 4–5 (“Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold, it is and will be
consumed in order to be valorized in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange. Knowledge
ceases to be an end in itself, it loses its ‘use-value.’”).
29. MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF MADNESS (Jean Khalfa ed., Jonathan Murphy & Jean
Khalfa trans., Routledge 2006) (1961).
30. Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/Foucault (last modified Sept. 17, 2008).
31. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed.
1995) (1977) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH].
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Foucault more fully developed his argument that science is as much a social
construction as anything else.32 In a 1975 interview, Foucault said:
‘[I]f you are not like everybody else, then you are abnormal, if
you are abnormal, then you are sick. These three categories, not
being like everybody else, not being normal and being sick are in
fact very different but have been reduced to the same thing.’33

What Foucault describes is deference to scientific expertise run wild.
Cloaked in the guise of scientific objectivity, a medical profession wrote
definitions and determined courses of treatment, and in effect set its own
jurisdiction, without any hint of constraint on its authority. This
classification of persons based on sexual orientation would hold sway over
the psychiatric profession until 1973.34
Foucault had a compelling reason for straining against the dominant
pseudo-science of the time: He was gay.35 It is compelling to consider what
it must have been like for Foucault to battle the powerful medical
profession and how that profession demeaned his identity. It is doubly
compelling to consider how such a categorization was so readily accepted
in Foucault’s time, given how modern science regards those
categorizations.36 It is triply compelling to consider that this label of
“mentally ill” was attached to one of the twentieth century’s most original
thinkers because of his sexual orientation.
32. MICHAEL S. FOLDY, THE TRIALS OF OSCAR WILDE: DEVIANCE, MORALITY, AND LATE
VICTORIAN SOCIETY 85 (1997); DAVID HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY AND
OTHER ESSAYS ON GREEK LOVE 16 (1990); see FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 31, at
199 (using social shame surrounding illness as an example).
33. Quotes of the Month, MICHEL-FOUCAULT.COM, http://www.michel-foucault.com/quote/
2005q.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (quoting MICHEL FOUCAULT, ENTRETIENS 95 (Roger-Pol Droit
ed., 2004)).
34. The American Psychiatric Association removed “homosexuality” from its list of mental
disorders in 1973. LGBT-Sexual Orientation, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry.org/
mental-health/people/lgbt-sexual-orientation (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). The proponent of the removal,
Robert Spitzer, is considered a luminary in the psychiatry field. Benedict Carey, Psychiatry Giant Sorry
for Backing Gay Cure,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/health/drrobert-l-spitzer-noted-psychiatrist-apologizes-for-study-on-gay-cure.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
Ironically, Spitzer authored a study in 2003 on a treatment that could reverse, or “cure,” homosexuality
a study for which he recently issued a public apology in the journal which published the original study.
Robert L. Spitzer, Letter to the Editor, Spitzer Reassesses His 2003 Study of Reparative Therapy of
Homosexuality, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 757 (2012).
35. DAVID M. HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT: TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 3 (1995).
36. See, e.g., Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N,
http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/orientation.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (“Since 1975, the American
Psychological Association has called on psychologists to take the lead in removing the stigma of mental
illness that has long been associated with lesbian, gay, and bisexual orientations.”).
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Foucault thus serves as a fulcrum for postmodernism not only because
of his revolutionary theory but also his personal story. But his skepticism is
only the beginning of postmodernism. Another strand of postmodernist
literature seeks to deconstruct language to reveal embedded societal biases
hidden in word choices and phraseology.37 Jacques Derrida, another
twentieth century French philosopher, pioneered a school of thought that
sought to overturn conventional acceptance of key words and phrases as
descriptors of objective fact. For Derrida and the deconstructionist
movement, things and situations are susceptible to multiple interpretations,
and how any given individual interprets a thing or situation is a product of
that individual’s “enculturation,” or her personal and social history.38
Postmodernist deconstruction thus posits that meaning is never really
stable.39 Like Lyotard, Derrida would be skeptical of an interpretation of
one thing or situation being applied to another.
As a body of thought, postmodernism has waned in influence, even in
its most hospitable environment, academia.40 A theory premised upon
skepticism that there is ever an accurate description of anything is
especially irritating to researchers in the social, biological, and physical
37. BUTLER, supra note 20, at 16–19.
38. Postmodernists argue that enculturation is a process by which values and privileges are
made a part of a supposedly neutral process, like education, and by which a Western world view has
come to be seen as natural and normal. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION: THEORY AND
RESEARCH 547 (Joan E. Grusec & Paul D. Hastings eds., 2007) (“[E]nculturation . . . is an
encompassing or surrounding of the individual by one’s culture; the individual acquires appropriate
values and behaviors by learning what the culture deems to be necessary.”). Derrida’s term
“Logocentrism” refers to the way society tends to order binaries and then take for granted the
naturalness of this ranking. Logocentrism is described as “any signifying system governed by the notion
of the self-presence of meaning; i.e. any system structured by a valorization of speech over writing,
immediacy over distance.” JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION 440 (Barbara Johnson trans.,
Continuum 2004) (1972); see also JACQUES DERRIDA, POSITIONS, at xxiii (Alan Bass trans., Continuum
2004) (1972) (“‘Logocentrism’ . . . [is] the deep-laid metaphysical prejudice whereby the values of truth
and reason are equated with a privileged epistemic access to thoughts ‘in the mind’ of those presumed or
authorized to know.”); DERMOT MORAN, INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY 448 (2000)
(“Logocentrism refers to the manner in which the traditional prioritisation of reason in philosophy has
led to everything deemed ‘irrational’ to be swept aside, treated as marginal and insignificant.”).
39. Deconstruction is a process or analytical technique used to reveal information that may not
be obvious or immediately apparent. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL: A CONVERSATION WITH
JACQUES DERRIDA 31 (John D. Caputo ed., 1997) (“The very meaning and mission of deconstruction is
to show that things—texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs, and practices of whatever size and
sort you need—do not have definable meanings and determinable missions, that they are always more
than any mission would impose, that they exceed the boundaries they currently occupy.”).
40. EDWARD SLINGERLAND, WHAT SCIENCE OFFERS THE HUMANITIES: INTEGRATING BODY
AND CULTURE 96 (2008) (“Bourdieu and the later Latour seem to me to belong to the twilight years of
postmodernism, a stage where postmodern theorists have become aware of inadequacies in the strong
postmodernist position but have nowhere else to turn.”); Butler, supra note 20, at 127 (“I believe that the
period of [postmodernism’s] greatest influence is now over.”).
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sciences. Research agendas in these types of fields are premised upon some
widely agreed-upon goalposts, even if subsequent paradigm-shifting
discoveries wind up moving those goalposts.41 For these fields, such is the
price of progress: error and failure. Postmodernists do not readily accept
that cost. Their concern typically lies with those that are disadvantaged by
change, and it seems a shame to accept such sacrifices for truths that are
ultimately fleeting. But this fixation on failure is what has cost
postmodernism a seat at even the widely inclusive academic table:
Postmodernists have become good at opposing and have lost an ability to
articulate what they are for. Christopher Butler has written:
[P]ostmodernists are good critical deconstructors, and terrible
constructors. They tend to leave that job to those patient liberals
in their society who are still willing to attempt to sort out at least
some of those differences between truth and fantasy, which
postmodernists blur in a whirlwind of pessimistic assumptions
about the inevitability of class or psychological conflict.42

Postmodernists never expected to make friends peddling a body of
thought predicated almost solely upon skepticism. But in an academic
marketplace of ideas, what most seem to have concluded is that even if the
reflexive skepticism of postmodernists happen to be proven correct, it does
not actually do any good to adopt a postmodernist perspective. Not only
does postmodernism fail to provide any guidance on moving forward, its
core mission is to cast doubt on the validity of any such guidance.43
Whereas scientists of all sorts—physical, biological, or social—predicate
their research on progress, postmodernists remind us of the pitfalls of
progress.
II. POSTMODERNIST OBJECTIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWMAKING
No one has ever been truly happy with environmental law. Not even in
its heady early days, when environmental advocates scored important U.S.

41. BUTLER, supra note 20, at 17.
42. Id. at 116.
43. See, e.g., SLINGERLAND, supra note 40, at 143 (“Whether or not it is . . . possible for a
human being to genuinely embrace an attitude of extreme skepticism, the self-refuting nature of
skepticism makes it difficult to see . . . how it could function as a viable intellectual position . . . .”);
BUTLER, supra note 20, at 61 (“For many, the postmodernist position is a disabling one—
postmodernists are just epistemological pluralists, with no firm general position available to
them . . . .”).
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Supreme Court victories,44 did environmental advocates believe that they
could use the law to adequately protect the environment.45 Regulated
industries, of course, have always complained about costly, burdensome
regulations and red tape.46 Even in the presence of divided legislatures and
fractured polities, it would be surprising if no one ever suggested
improvements to environmental law.
But environmental postmodernists counsel caution in reforming or
changing environmental law. Some proposed reforms strike a nerve and
excite such strong passions that adversaries seem to believe they are
fighting for the soul of environmental law. This Article focuses on
opposition to the use of CBA in environmental law and argues that much of
the opposition to CBA is postmodernist in nature.
There is an additional development that signals changing times in
environmental law. In recent years, the role of physical and biological
sciences in environmental lawmaking seems to have become more
controversial. Often, the nature of these objections is on the merits:
Disagreement can arise because of differences of opinion on scientific
method, interpretation, or techniques. But increasingly, accusations of bias,
disingenuousness, and conflict of interest are being levied on scientists. The
objectivity of scientists has been questioned, and evidence of bias may stem
from their professional position, funding, and incentives to reach a
particular result in their scientific research. This too is postmodern. Rather
than engage on the merits of a scientific debate, postmodernists are urging
lawmakers to draw inferences from circumstantial evidence. Here too
postmodernism is influential in that it urges us to look beyond the text and
the putative merits of something proffered and skeptically consider inputs
into a proposal or process. Importantly, this kind of postmodern attack has
been as much a mark of regulated industries as it has been of liberal
environmental groups.

44. For example, environmental advocacy groups frequently cite Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill as an example of an upset victory by an environmental interest over a well-funded industrial one
under the Endangered Species Act. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978); see also Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (allowing the then-nascent Sierra Club to stop development of a
ski resort).
45. SAMUEL P. HAYS, A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS SINCE 1945, at 198 (2000)
[hereinafter HAYS, A HISTORY] (“For others, none of the varied environmental programs worked; they
were a massive waste of effort and funds.”).
46. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 1243, 1244 (1987) (“Critics argued that federal agencies operated beyond the range of effective
political control and were irrationally imposing burdensome requirements on regulated entities without
considering the social costs of the regulations.”).
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A. The Postmodernist Objection to Cost-Benefit Analysis
It is no exaggeration to say that quietly and behind the scenes, the
administrative practice of federal environmental law has changed
significantly. Proponents and detractors agree that CBA has, in fact, grown
in importance in federal environmental law- and policy-making.47 To hear
CBA proponents describe this development, CBA is a welcome tweak and a
refinement of environmental law- and policy-making.48 To hear critics
describe it, CBA imminently and gravely threatens the health of humans
and the environment.49
CBA in environmental law applies a cost-benefit test to a legal or
policy change. Public projects are almost always subjected to a CBA to
determine if the project’s benefits will outweigh the costs, or if the value of
the outputs will exceed the value of the inputs.50 For federal rulemakings, a
proposed environmental regulation is subjected to a review by the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which is responsible for CBAs
mandated by executive orders issued by past and current presidents.51 It is
in this area that CBA generates the most controversy: The suggestion that a

47. See, e.g., Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 16, at 435 (“CBA has only strengthened its
dominance in the past twenty-five years.”); Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1345, 1355 n.36 (2003) (“[F]or better or worse, cost-benefit analysis (with all of its built-in value
assumptions) has been ratified by Congress—and applied to regulation . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, CostBenefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1656–63 (2001) (describing the shift from the
“apparently cost-blind” environmental regulations of the 1970s to a greater focus on CBA principles);
Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species Why Less Is More in the Economic Analysis of
Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 184 (2004) (“Indeed, formal economic
cost-benefit analysis now enjoys a level of acceptance and credibility in both academic and government
circles that was unthinkable three decades ago.”).
48. See, e.g., John D. Graham, Saving Lives through Administrative Law and Economics, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2008) (arguing that “lifesaving regulation informed by” CBA has advantages over
regulation informed by alternatives to CBA); see also, RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL LIVERMORE,
RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT
AND OUR HEALTH 3 (2008) (arguing that CBA can improve environmental regulatory decisions).
49. Lisa Heinzerling describes a table created by John Morall and used for cost-benefit analysis
as “a Trojan horse that has been wheeled into the debate over regulatory reform, loaded with the values
the debate is supposed to be about.” Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107
YALE L.J. 1981, 2070 (1998) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions]. John
Morall is an economist who worked at the Office of Management and Budget during the 1980s. Id. at
1983.
50. RICHARD O. ZERBE JR. & ALLEN S. BELLAS, A PRIMER FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 2
(2006).
51. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12866 § 2(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51735, 51737 (Oct. 4, 1993)
(describing OIRA’s role in renewing regulations).
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regulation to protect human health or the environment should pass some
sort of “test” is viewed as being just an extra obstacle to regulation.52
At the outset, it is necessary to acknowledge, without resolving, two
non-postmodernist objections. Daniel Farber and Lisa Heinzerling are
among those that have argued that applying CBA to certain environmental
and labor standards violates statutory mandates by which Congress
delegated authority to the EPA, OSHA, and other regulatory agencies.53 A
number of statutes mandate standard setting, but then set out some basis or
criteria that suggest, in Farber’s view, an intent to preclude use of CBA.54
Phrases such as “requisite to protect the public health”55 or “lowest
achievable emission rate”56 seem to direct the EPA to take only some
considerations into account, but not costs.57 These provisions are especially
noteworthy when juxtaposed against provisions in which Congress did
seem to contemplate the use of CBA. For example, § 304(b)(4) of the Clean
Water Act requires the “best conventional pollutant control technology,”
which includes some consideration of the reasonableness of costs vis-à-vis
the benefits.58 But while this is an important question—and possibly a
legally dispositive one—it will not decide the ultimate fate of CBA.
Congress obviously could, if it were in the mood (and politically able),
statutorily authorize or even mandate agencies to do CBA. The ultimate
question is whether it should.
A second non-postmodernist objection, from Douglas Kysar in his
book Regulating From Nowhere, is that CBA lacks the moral content
necessary to guide environmental law- and policy-making.59 CBA rejects
any normative criteria other than a decidedly rough welfare calculus, which
is, in Kysar’s view, incongruous with the way that both individuals and
groups make choices.60 Furthermore, Kysar argues, the embrace of CBA
would have something of a moral numbing effect that threatens to rob
52. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Risking It All, 57 ALA. L. REV. 103, 113 (2005) (“[A]t OMB
today, cost-benefit analysis continues to be what it has always been—a one-way street to
deregulation.”).
53. Daniel Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1355,
1356–57 (2009); Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1097, 1098 (2006).
54. Farber, supra note 53, at 1358.
55. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012).
56. Id. § 7412(d).
57. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 466–68 (2001).
58. Best Conventional Pollutant Control Technology; Effluent Limitation Guidelines, 51 Fed.
Reg. 24974, 24974 (July 9, 1986).
59. DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 13 (2010).
60. Id. at 14–15.
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environmental policy of any moral content whatsoever. Kysar rejects the
consequentialist approach implicit in CBA in favor of a more traditionally
deontological view of environmental law. Professor Kysar’s work always
merits a serious response, but I do not undertake that here. The focus of this
Article is a certain type of argument that implicitly raises epistemological
issues more complicated than environmental postmodernists acknowledge.
Objections by Professors Kysar, Farber, and Heinzerling (at least the ones
she raises that are described above) raise a number of other issues, but are
not postmodern.
The broader normative question is whether CBA offers a better
decision-making process for environmental law- and policy-making.
Implicitly, the environmental postmodern objection is that CBA is
inherently and perhaps purposively biased, so, from a public interest and
environmental quality perspective, it must be inferior. Environmental
postmodernists believe that CBA is: (1) more manipulable by regulated
industries than traditional lawmaking processes; and (2) structurally and
inherently biased against environmental and public health values. Analyses
of these two objections now follow.
1. CBA is Manipulable
Environmental postmodernists argue that CBA is inherently
indeterminate. Clashes over environmental regulation are clashes over
values, which are inherently subjective.61 But CBA purports to transcend a
value-centered debate and offer an objective alternative, thereby glossing
over the indeterminacy. Writes Amy Sinden:
Because it is indeterminate, CBA exacerbates the problem of
power imbalance. First, it hides the fact of its indeterminacy
behind a false veil of seemingly accurate, scientific and objective
numbers, thus masking the value judgments that must inevitably
go into choosing such numbers.62

That indeterminacy creates the opportunity for manipulation. Continues
Sinden:
[I]ndeterminacy renders CBA not only ineffectual, but also
endlessly manipulable . . . . [F]or any claim that the benefits of a
61. Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, supra note 49, at 1986.
62. Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental
Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1454 (2005) [hereinafter Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes].
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particular project outweigh its costs, another economist can make
a credible argument that the costs outweigh the benefits.63

Rena Steinzor, the president of the Center for Progressive Reform, echoes
these objections:
Billed as a non-ideological analytical tool, CBA today is in fact
the opposite: questionable value judgments masked as technical
calculations, all used as window-dressing to block rules that
benefit the public but upset powerful industries.64

Manipulation need not even be so blunt. CBA can shift not only the terms
of the debate but also the locus. For some environmental postmodernists,
CBA is a move to an anti-democratic mode of decision-making, one in
which public debate is quashed. Mark Sagoff has argued:
Cost-benefit approaches to public policy . . . substitute
themselves for the processes of democratic government. The
genius of cost-benefit analysis is to localize conflict among
affected individuals and thereby to prevent it from breaking out
into the public realm . . . . The deeper reason [that industry favors
cost-benefit analysis] may be that cost-benefit analysis defines a
framework for conflict that keeps the public qua public and the
citizen qua citizen out.65

These accidental environmental postmodernists are telling us that CBA
is indeterminate, and therefore manipulable, and that powerful industries
manipulate CBA to consolidate their power. But these accounts have been
told before by the older, traditional, post-structuralist postmodernists.
Postmodernists have been arguing that power is exercised through the guise
of objectivity and neutrality. The postmodern argument is that what people
perceive as truthful and accurate is really a function of what powerful
interests assert as being truthful and accurate. In writing about the
63. Id. at 1409–10.
64. Rena Steinzor, The Unpopularity of Cost-Benefit Analysis, CPRBLOG (Sept. 14, 2012),
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=C51BD4A8-9EF0-DBA17C1ECE949C6E19CB; see also Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J.
2341, 2366 (2002) (“At the end of the day, one is left with a pressing need to know why a person with
Professor Sunstein’s obvious intelligence and even disposition would conclude that all of this
occasionally comprehensible, but frequently preposterous and always manipulable number spinning,
could possibly lead to better decisionmaking in the real world.”).
65. MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 97 (1988).
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“‘political economy’ of truth,” Foucault challenges the positivist notion that
there is one immutable “truth”:
[T]ruth isn’t outside power . . . . Each society has its régime of
truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth . . . . ‘[T]ruth’ is centred on the
form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it;
it is subject to constant economic and political incitement[;] . . . it
is produced and transmitted under the control . . . of a few great
political and economic apparatuses . . . .66

That reform proposals insert themselves into a democratic process
under a pretense of neutrality, but are really instituted to consolidate power,
is a fundamental postmodern idea. One of Foucault’s examples was the
institution of “People’s courts” during the French revolution, introduced (in
Foucault’s view) not to actually mete out justice, but to partly insulate a
bourgeoisie from the violent masses67:
[T]he people’s court . . . did tend to act as a ‘neutral
institution’ . . . . [It] took up a position as intermediary,
and . . . functioned as a mediator; in doing this it drew on an
ideology which was up to a certain point the ideology of the
dominant class, which determined what . . . was ‘right’ or ‘not
right’ . . . .68

Foucault is describing, in his view, the introduction of the People’s
courts not as actually neutral institutions of “justice,” but as political
instruments. Foucault was a legal realist!69 This substitution took place
66. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS
1972–1977, at 131–32 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980) (1972) [hereinafter
FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE].
67. Foucault is likely referring to the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris, organized during the
French Revolution to mete out justice, at least in the non-postmodernist account. To be sure, it was
rough justice at best and not truly a “court” in the sense that modern scholars would understand it. See,
e.g., JAMES L. GODFREY, A STUDY IN THE ORGANIZATION, PERSONNEL, AND PROCEDURE OF THE PARIS
TRIBUNAL, 1793–1795, at 14, 7–8, 10 (1951). So-called Peoples’ courts have been utilized in several
countries in the way that Foucault describes, as a political palliative. See, e.g., John N. Hazard, Soviet
Law An Introduction, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1265 (1936) (“The state machine has used the law and
the courts as its tools together with the army and police to preserve its authority. This law has changed
from formal inequality under the slaveholding state and the feudal state to formal equality under the
state administered by the bourgeoisie. But even under this most recent stage, the Marxist explains that it
has never lost its factual inequality as between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the exploiting and the
exploited classes.”).
68. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 66, at 3.
69. In simple terms, legal realism was a counterpoint to formalism, and a reaction against the
notion that legal rules could serve as a bedrock for legal administration. For a general treatise and
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against a backdrop in which masses were capable of (and indeed did) carry
out acts of vengeance and revolt that horrified French elites, hence the need
to calm the masses.
The postmodern and environmental postmodern narratives do not
parallel perfectly. Foucault deconstructs a court system, while
environmental postmodernists deconstruct economics. According to
Foucault, the French bourgeoisie attempted to appease the violent masses
by installing a judicial system; however sharp the environmental
postmodernist criticism, there has not been any threat of decapitation (yet).
But the dynamic is the same: the introduction of a new institution that poses
as a neutral arbiter, but in reality is an attempt to seize power. The French
bourgeoisie can control the outcomes of court decisions, and economists
can control the outcome of CBAs; there is no real neutrality at all. The
manipulability of CBA is a rebirth of a postmodernist fear of alien control.
To environmental postmodernists, the only reason that CBA is proposed is
to achieve a particular result. Hoping naively that CBA can improve
environmental lawmaking is like hoping that guardian foxes can overcome
their taste for chicken.
2. CBA is Structurally Biased
On another level, environmental postmodernists go beyond the
manipulability argument and make the more fundamental argument: Not
only does CBA give regulated industry a backdoor, but it creates a
structural bias against the environment. In this account, the affirmative,
conscious manipulation of CBA is barely necessary. The game is already
rigged. According to critics, the nature of CBA is such that it tilts the good
faith practice of CBA against environmental protection.70 Lisa Heinzerling,
perhaps the strongest critic of CBA, has written:
The problem is not only that those who start from an
antienvironmental perspective have often used cost-benefit
analysis to support their preconceptions. Even when the methods
are applied in good faith by neutral or environmentally inclined
investigators, we will see that the results tilt strongly toward

critique of legal realism see LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927–1960 (1986); see also
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466–67 (1897) (“[C]ertainty
generally is illusion . . . Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance
of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment . . . . I think that the
judges . . . have failed . . . to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.”).
70. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 6, at 36.
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endorsement of business as usual, and rejection of health and
environmental protection.71

How did that happen? How did a supposedly neutral social science—
economics—become not just a policy tool for regulated industries, but a
whole new ballgame in which the environment and public health always
lose?
The answer offered by environmental postmodernists is that CBA is
just another falsely objective means of moving environmental discourse
onto another battleground—economics—in which industrial interests have
an advantage over environmental advocates. Inherent in CBA is an
emphasis on monetary values. Compared with environmental values, the
industrial compliance costs of environmental regulation are clearly more
measurable, more recognizable, and therefore over-weighted in CBA
relative to environmental values. The scales are inherently tipped against
environmental values. Writes Amy Sinden:
[E]fforts at quantification are inevitably systematically skewed in
favor of the costs and against the benefits of environmental
protection. First, because the benefits of regulation are generally
harder to quantify than the costs, the benefits tend to be
undercounted. . . . Second, because estimates of the costs of
regulations are often provided by the industry facing regulation,
they are often artificially, self-servingly high.72

Moreover, to do CBAs, one needs economists; economists cost money,
and industrial interests have money to spend on mercenary economists,
whereas environmental advocacy groups still scrape up just enough money
to keep the lights on.73 Thus, the CBA criticism that it requires resources
that regulated industries have but environmental advocacy groups do not, is
postmodernist in the sense that it argues CBA is a power grab.
Beyond these points, environmental postmodernists argue that there is
a more subtle, but more serious effect. Environmental postmodernists claim
that CBA introduces an alternative language that conceals indeterminacy
and falsely projects neutrality and objectivity. Writes Lisa Heinzerling:

71. Id.
72. Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes, supra note 62, at 1457–58.
73. See, e.g., id. at 1410 (“[B]y framing the discussion in the esoteric technical terms of
economic theory and thereby putting a premium on the ability to hire expensive experts, CBA
exacerbates the extent to which that political process is inaccessible to the average citizen and skewed in
favor of powerful, monied, corporate interests.”).
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Most of these people are economists or law professors who have
a special interest and expertise in economics. Perhaps costbenefit analysis is more transparent to these experts because they
speak its language.74

This linguistic sleight-of-hand is particularly insidious because, as it
turns out, people like objectivity and precision. CBA supplies them with
exactly that, albeit under false pretense. Environmental postmodernists
assert that clashes over environmental regulation are clashes over values,
which are inherently subjective.75 CBA purports to transcend a valuecentered debate and offer an objective alternative, thereby offering people a
way out of the messy business of grappling with value clashes, and
essentially leaving it up to arbitration by economics. In criticizing an
influential study in the 1980s by former Office of Management and Budget
official John Morrall,76 Heinzerling writes:
Value choices of this kind underlie Morrall’s numbers, as well as
my own. To say that one of these sets of numbers is true, and the
other false, is thus misleading. It depends on one’s hopes, fears,
and anxieties.77

Later in the article, Heinzerling continues:
Many thoughtful scholars of the regulatory process have
embraced the numerical results of Morrall’s table . . . . These
numbers are beguiling because they promise objectivity and
clarity. . . . At worst, they derail thoughtful discussion by offering
the illusion of objective accuracy . . . .78

What, then, is CBA doing when it conceals the indeterminacy and the
value choices? It is tacitly choosing a set of assumptions that are not
necessarily shared by all. Indeed, environmental postmodernists suggest
that these assumptions are quite narrowly shared only by regulated
industries. And these assumptions happen to be those that economists tend
to make, so goes the argument. CBA is the elevation of economics over all

74. Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, supra note 6, at 2338.
75. Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, supra note 49, at 1986.
76. John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov./Dec. 1986, at 25, 25. In
the study, Morall examined the benefits and costs of forty-four federal health and safety regulations. Id.
at 25, 30 tbl.4.
77. Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, supra note 49, at 1986.
78. Id. at 2070.

2014]

The Accidental Postmodernists

47

other ways of thinking and deciding, and the crowding out—consciously,
environmental postmodernists would contend—of all others. CBA is thus
not a neutral policy tool, but a rhetorical barrier that privileges certain
groups at the expense of others. The language of economics becomes
power.
This line of argument is so perfectly postmodern that Foucault,
Derrida, and Lyotard could not have scripted a better policy problem for
postmodernist objection. Had they engaged with the dismal science79 they
probably would have made exactly this argument. As with many things
postmodern, language plays a central role in exercising power under the
guise of neutrality. In Power/Knowledge, Foucault sets out his theory on the
use of language in projecting power. In it, he writes:
‘Dialectic’ is a way of evading the always open and hazardous
reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton, and
‘semiology’ is a way of avoiding its violent, bloody and lethal
character by reducing it to the calm Platonic form of language
and dialogue.80

What Foucault brought to the fore was the theory that calm and order
were achieved not by brute physical power, but by language. This use of
language is central to postmodern theory. Postmodernist feminist scholar
Judith Butler has argued that power is exercised through falsely neutral
language. In Excitable Speech, she writes:
Power works through dissimulation: it comes to appear as
something other than itself, indeed, it comes to appear as a
name.81

Language creates norms, and norms are the hidden way in which power is
covertly exercised. In The Psychic Life of Power Butler writes:

79. To this author’s knowledge the only significant exchange between postmodernists and
economists was two public lectures on March 14 and 21, 1979, by Foucault on Gary Becker’s Crime
and Punishment An Economic Approach, 76 J. POLIT. ECON. 169 (1968), and Becker’s body of work on
human capital. See “Becker and Foucault on Crime and Punishment” A Conversation with Gary
Becker, Francois Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt The Second Session 1 (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law
and Economics, Working Paper No. 654, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2321912. The points of agreement and disagreement were left unclear. Id. at 2.
80. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 66, at 114–15.
81. JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 36 (1997).
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The psychic operation of the norm offers a more insidious route
for regulatory power than explicit coercion, one whose success
allows its tacit operation within the social.82

Although traditional postmodernist theorists never seemed to target
economics, the core notion that language is really indeterminate and
therefore a fundamental instrument of power is exactly what CBA critics
argue. Economics as a discipline does not overtly privilege itself over other
social sciences, but does generally hew closely to a set of core modeling
principles, such as rationality and maximization assumptions.83 As such, it
incorporates quantitative preferences that are somewhat antithetical to
qualitative preferences in social sciences, such as sociology and
anthropology.84 Although most economists have made peace with
psychology, economics remains a field that is intellectually insular.85 And if
economists refuse to engage seriously with at least some social scientists, it
opens them up to claims that they “privilege” their own work over that of
others. Whether or not this is a fair characterization, it would sound familiar
to Jean-Francois Lyotard, who wrote:
Scientific knowledge requires that one language game,
denotation, be retained and all others excluded. . . . Scientific
knowledge is in this way set apart from the language games that
combine to form the social bond.86

Similarly, in Two Lectures, Michel Foucault wrote:
[B]y subjugated knowledges one should understand something
else, . . . namely, a whole set of knowledges that have been
disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently
elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the

82. JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER 21 (1997).
83. Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic
Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 317, 324, 340 (1977); Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and
as Produce of Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REV., May 1978, at 1, 2–10.
84. See, e.g., Immanuel Wallerstein, Anthropology, Sociology, and Other Dubious Disciplines,
44 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 453, 455 (2003) (discussing three groupings of scholars in social
sciences).
85. Rik Pieters & Hans Baumgartner, Who Talks to Whom? Intra- and Interdisciplinary
Communication of Economics Journals, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 483, 498 (2002) (“The high percentage of
intradisciplinary citations (90 percent) in economics reflects a high level of intradisciplinary and a low
level of interdisciplinary knowledge building.”).
86. LYOTARD, supra note 18, at 25.
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The attack on CBA is really postmodernism reborn. Environmental
postmodernists have attacked CBA and its proponents in the same way that
Foucault attacked the psychiatric profession and Lyotard attacked the
sciences. No critic has tried to equate the two or suggest CBA is anything
like homophobia. In fact, environmental postmodernists do not appear to
see themselves as postmodernists at all. But in both cases, there arose a
profession—psychiatry in Foucault’s early days and economics today—that
offered a new direction in thinking and a new set of definitions. In both
cases, there is at least the perception that the profession is exclusive and
that members share a language that is alien to almost all outsiders. In both
cases, there is fear of a hidden agenda. And in both cases, there is some
apparent danger that the profession is allowed to largely regulate itself.
Thus, according to critics, not only is CBA re-creating the mistakes of the
past that have been wrought on unfortunate groups (including, but not
limited to, gays and lesbians), but CBA represents dangerous, permanent
and fundamental shifts in power, disenfranchising not just aggrieved
populations, but everybody outside the conquering profession.
The critique that CBA is a structural shift is the most fundamental
objection to CBA. If, as critics charge, it is impossible to make CBA
accessible or to make it more neutral in its application, and impossible to
refine it so that it takes better account of non-market environmental goods,
then there is no point in trying. The prescription would be to abandon CBA
altogether. At the same time, this structural argument makes the other
arguments irrelevant. Making CBA more accessible by translating results
into plain language is pointless because under a postmodernist critique,
such an effort would inevitably cloak or even reinforce the inherent bias.
Efforts by OIRA to make CBA more transparent are pointless and perhaps
even perpetuate the illusion of neutrality. In the strongest form of
environmental postmodernism, there is no legitimate role for CBA in
environmental law- and policy-making.
3. Do the Environmental Postmodernists Have a Point About CBA?
One need not be an environmental postmodernist to accept that CBA
has been manipulated, or even that fixing CBA faces some fairly daunting

87. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 66, at 82.
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epistemological challenges. Examples abound.88 In many cases, the
environmental postmodernists would appear to have a point.
Not only that, but rifts within the economic profession seem to show
that some economists really do behave in ways that postmodernists predict.
Some economists try to create differentiations of reputation among
economists in attempting (in their view) to safeguard the credibility of
economics. One of the most prominent and perhaps the most important
internecine battles pertains to a disagreement over the last decade over the
economic cost of greenhouse gas emissions. The “social cost of carbon,”
the harm avoided from reducing greenhouse gas emissions, is the figure
representing the benefit side of a CBA for policies to address climate
change. Yale economist William Nordhaus, one of the first economists to
even consider the costs of climate change, sparred sharply with British
economist Nicholas Stern, the author of the Stern Review on the Economics
of Climate Change.89 Stern’s opinion that the social cost of carbon was
about $85 per ton of CO290 contrasted with Nordhaus’s estimates, which
ranged from about $2.50 per ton91 to an updated estimate of $7.40 per ton.92
A number of differences in assumptions underlie the vast difference in
estimates, but the one that most accounts for the difference is Stern’s use of
an unusually low discount rate and Nordhaus’s use of a higher, more
traditional one.93 Uncertainty about future conditions uncontroversially
justifies some discounting of future costs and benefits, but how much?
Despite the entreaties of Nordhaus and others that choice of discount rate is
a purely economic matter and that Stern was out of bounds for assuming
such a low discount rate,94 most economists seem to have accepted that, at

88. See infra text accompanying notes 124–26.
89. NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, at i (2007),
available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_
index.htm.
90. Id. at 287.
91. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC MODELS
OF GLOBAL WARMING 91 tbl.4-10 (2000).
92. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON GLOBAL
WARMING POLICIES 15 (2008) [hereinafter NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE].
93. See, e.g., Thomas Sterner & U. Martin Persson, An Even Sterner Review Introducing
Relative Prices into the Discounting Debate, 2 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 61, 64 (2008) (“In fact,
much of the criticism of the Stern Review has focused . . . on the low discount rate used in the
analysis . . . .”); Daniel H. Cole, The Stern Review and Its Critics Implications for the Theory and
Practice of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 53, 66 (2008) (“[T]he Stern Review’s choice
of a very low , more than any other factor, explains why the Stern Review’s results differ so
dramatically from those of other climate change [benefit-costs analyses] . . . .”).
94. See, e.g., Gary Yohe, Some Thoughts on the Damage Estimates Presented in the Stern
Review—An Editorial, 6 INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT J. 65, 66–67 (2006); Gary W. Yohe & Richard S.J.
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least for climate change, there is no universally correct discount rate and
that discounting over such long-time horizons necessarily involves the
incorporation of some social values. Most economists would view Stern’s
discount rate to be as valid as Nordhaus’s.95
The dispute gets interesting because Nordhaus has not just been critical
of Stern, but has questioned his motivations and his sophistication.
Nordhaus wrote in a critique published in the Journal of Economic
Perspectives, that the Stern Review is essentially “political in nature and has
advocacy as its purpose.”96 Fellow economists Gary Yohe and Richard S.J.
Tol wrote that the Stern Review “subjected academic standards to political
goals.”97 Tol even remarked to a BBC reporter:
If a student of mine were to hand in [the Stern Review] as a
Masters thesis, perhaps if I were in a good mood I would give
him a ‘D’ for diligence; but more likely I would give him an ‘F’
for fail.98

Another tenet of economics is that it strives to be just descriptive,
rather than prescriptive.99 Nordhaus believes that his work is descriptive,
Tol, The Stern Review Implications for Climate Change, 49 ENV’T 36, 39 (2007) (discussing problems
associated with Stern’s use of “a very low discount rate”).
95. The subject of discounting is extremely complicated and controversial. See, e.g., Kenneth J.
Arrow et al., How Should Benefits and Costs Be Discounted in an Intergenerational Context? The Views
of an Expert Panel, RESOURCES FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION PAPER 12-53, at 8 (Dec. 2012), available at
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-12-53.pdf (“Many (but not all) of the panelists agree with
Frank Ramsey that it is ethically indefensible to discount the utility of future generations, except
possibly to take account of the fact that these generations may not exist . . . . Stern (2006), for example,
assumes that the hazard rate of extinction of the human race is 0 1 percent per year.”); see also
Lawrence H. Goulder & Roberton C. Williams, The Choice of Discount Rate for Climate Change Policy
Evaluation, RESOURCES FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION PAPER 12-43, at 2, 12, 14 (Sept. 2012)
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-12-43.pdf (comparing Stern’s discount rate to
Nordhaus’s); Martin S. Feldstein, The Social Time Preference Discount Rate in Cost Benefit Analysis,
74 ECON. J. 360, 360 (1964) (“Choosing between alternative time-streams of social benefits and costs is
one of the most difficult and most important problems in the evaluation of public investment projects.”);
Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant, Introduction to DISCOUNTING AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 1,
4 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999) (“[T]hose looking for guidance on the choice of a
discount rate could find justification for a rate at or near zero, as high as 20% and any and all values in
between.”).
96. William D. Nordhaus, A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change,
45 J. ECON. PERSP. 686, 688 (2007).
97. Yohe & Tol, supra note 94, at 39.
98. Simon Cox & Richard Vadon, Running the Rule Over Stern’s Numbers, BBC NEWS (Jan.
26, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6295021.stm.
99. See, e.g., Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and
Economics, 18 EUR. J. LAW & ECON. 259, 261 (2004) (describing the prescriptive limitations of
economists’ work) (“While the economist’s perspective could prove crucial for the positive analysis of
the efficiency of alternative legal rules and the study of the effects of alternative rules on the distribution
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while Stern’s is prescriptive and conflates economic analysis with lower
forms of knowledge, akin to “ethical ideals”:
Analyses are sometimes divided between the “descriptive
approach,” in which assumed discount rates should conform to
actual political and economic decisions and prices, and the
“prescriptive approach,” where discount rates should conform to
an ethical ideal, sometimes taken to be very low or even
zero. . . . The Stern Review takes the prescriptive approach in the
extreme . . . .100

Putting aside the implausibility of a professor issuing a failing grade to
a project such as the Stern Review, this is fodder for postmodernists because
the level of vitriol suggests a level of excitement not often seen among
practitioners of the dismal science. What are Nordhaus, Yohe, Tol, and
others so excited about? They are concerned not only about methods and
practice, but a stark and threatening divergence from a fundamental
economic practice. If discount rates can be varied as widely as Stern’s
review suggests, then CBAs can be anything, and if CBAs can be anything,
then the currency of economics is at risk. The response of Nordhaus and
other economists is to rush to defend a practice of economics. Nordhaus’s
dismissal of the Stern Review as “political advocacy,” and Tol’s mock
grade of the Stern Review are not only attempts to separate themselves from
Stern, but to degrade Stern’s standing in the economic profession.
As Sheila Jasanoff chronicles in her prescient book, The Fifth
Branch,101 a profession will do “‘boundary work’” to restrict entry into the
profession, thereby limiting those with privilege to invoke the authority of
the profession.102 Economists racing to castigate Stern are concerned in the
first instance with the prestige and exclusiveness of the economics
profession and its privileged voice in public policy. Castigating Stern’s
work as “ethical,” “political,” “prescriptive,” worthy of a grade of “D” or
“F” is an attempt to police the boundaries of economics, and an attempt to
place Stern on the outside, in the interests of maintaining the authorities of
those inside. Perhaps the likes of Nordhaus and Tol simply suffered from
moments of ill temper, but there is enough recurrence on their parts to
suggest otherwise. Perhaps they are policing the boundaries they perceive
of wealth and income, economists generally recognized the limits of their role in providing normative
prescriptions for social change or legal reform.”).
100. William Nordhaus, Critical Assumptions in the Stern Review on Climate Change, 317
SCIENCE 201, 202 (2007).
101. SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS 14 (1990).
102. Id.
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to define sound economics. That is exactly what Foucault would have
predicted.
But environmental postmodernists claim too much when they
extrapolate this kind of behavior into the grander claim that there is a
conspiracy at work. Ignoring the many internal tensions inside economics,
they mistakenly cast the economic profession as a monolith with a clearly
defined, anti-regulatory objective in mind. Some postmodernists may be
surprised to learn how many economists would agree with the contention
that economics is flawed with respect to its application to environmental
problems. Good economists would concede that much gets lost in the
simplifying assumptions that are made in the course of a CBA.103 And good
economists would also concede that, even as they try their best to avoid
using economic jargon themselves, economics does in fact involve a
different set of terms.104
Another important divergence between the Stern camp and the
Nordhaus camp, one that gives credence to postmodernists who claim a
structural bias in CBA, is their disagreement over the valuation of
nonmarket impacts. Part of what made Stern’s estimates higher than
Nordhaus’s105 is Stern’s attempt to incorporate some hard-to-value nonmarket impacts from climate change, such as the loss of biological diversity
and impacts on human health.106 Without denying the importance of these
impacts, Nordhaus finds these impacts speculative.107 Adherents of this
view would omit non-market environmental and ecological impacts as
better than taking a good-faith, but poorly executed, attempt to quantify
them. There is something arbitrary, under that view, of making a bad
attempt at quantification, that smacks of making something up.
Were that the prevailing view, then of course the environmental
postmodernists would be correct in arguing there is a systemic bias against
environmental and ecological values in CBA, at least with respect to
103. See, e.g., Winston Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling & Richard D. Morgenstern, Controversies
Surrounding Regulatory Impact Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 10, 13
(Winston Harrington et al. eds., 2009) (“Most economists would acknowledge that CBA does not
incorporate all factors that can and should influence judgments on the social worth of a policy and that
individual preference satisfaction is not the only criterion.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds , 6th ed. 2003).
104. See, e.g., Don Fullerton & Robert Stavins, How Economists See the Environment, NATURE,
Oct. 1998, at 433, 433 (“Economists themselves may have contributed to some misunderstandings about
how they think about the environment . . . perhaps simply by the use of jargon.”).
105. NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 92, at 93.
106. STERN, supra note 89, at 143, 422 (including estimates of non-market impacts, which he
describes as “impacts on the environment and human health,” which would include impacts on wildlife
and unpriced effects on human health, such as increased spread of disease due to climatic changes).
107. NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 92, at 182.
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climate change. But that is not the prevailing view. Staying within a
traditional neoclassical economic tradition, Harvard economist Martin
Weitzman has written one the most influential papers of all, warning of the
limitations of CBA due to the “thick-tailed” statistical distribution of
damage probabilities.108 Swedish environmental economist Thomas Sterner
has written about the need to account for the possibility that environmental
goods could be so scarce in a climate-changed world that traditional CBAs
would systemically underprice environmental damages.109 Most revealing is
that while Nordhaus’s writings remain influential, his estimates of the
social cost of carbon are clearly on the low side of an economic literature
that has become quite crowded with estimates of the costs of climate
change.110
It is perhaps puzzling that postmodernism has taken such a long time to
mount an attack on economics, and that it has come in the form of
apparently unwitting, accidental postmodernists. The older, French
postmodernism closer to Foucault clearly attacked the sciences. While
economists consider themselves social scientists, with an empirical tradition
similar to the physical, biological, and medical sciences,111 they have
clearly not achieved the universality, concrete falsifiability, and
experimental verification methods achieved by their more respectable,
cross-campus colleagues.112 Moreover, economists have stubbornly
maintained a habit of being intellectually insular and have guarded their
boundaries vigorously. And although economists profess neutrality, it is at
least superficially plausible that economics has been used to justify

108. Martin Weitzman, A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 45
J. ECON. LITERATURE 703, 704 (2007). Weitzman has argued that traditional CBAs, which assume a
normal distribution of damage probabilities, might not be appropriate for climate change, in which the
unlikely but catastrophic outcomes of climate change are so costly that their representation on a
statistical distribution should be “thicker” than that allowed by a normal distribution. Id. at 710, 717.
109. Sterner & Persson, supra note 93, at 62.
110. See, e.g., INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF
CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 13 tbl.2 (2013),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/technical-update-socialcost-of-carbon-for-regulator-impact-analysis.pdf (showing the federal government’s estimates); Arrow
et al., supra note 95, at 8 (showing an expert panel’s estimates); Goulder & Williams, supra note 95, at
1 (showing policy analysts’ estimates).
111. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., C.S. LEWIS, THE SCREWTAPE LETTERS: A DEVIL’S DIABOLICAL ADVICE FOR THE
CAPTURING OF THE HUMAN HEART 10 (Am. Reprint Co. rev. ed. 1982) (1942) (“There have been sad
cases among the modern physicists. If he must dabble in science, keep him on economics and
sociology . . . . [T]he best of all is to let him read no science but to give him a grand general idea that he
knows it all . . . .”).

2014]

The Accidental Postmodernists

55

increasing gaps in power, wealth, and justice113—typically a central concern
to postmodernists.114 So one would think that economics would long have
been a tempting target for postmodernist disgruntlement. Instead,
postmodernists seem to have avoided economics altogether.
In a widely cited review of postmodernism and the social sciences,
postmodern scholar Pauline Marie Rosenau addresses postmodern
engagement with history, geography, women’s studies, public
administration, sociology, anthropology, political science, and
psychology115—but not economics. It has instead fallen to several
environmental law professors to marshal an epistemological attack on
economics. Environmental postmodernists, in seizing on a reform
movement revolving around CBA, have grasped that the economic
profession is an ascendant threat to public policymaking. Whether
economics improves public policy or not, it does seem poised to
intellectually displace other approaches, including that of environmental
lawyers.
Environmental postmodernists have a weapon that they do not appear
to have utilized yet: evolutionary psychology. Jonathan Haidt, in his
acclaimed book The Righteous Mind, argues that people do not naturally
employ reason to reach a conclusion, but they overwhelmingly tend to have
an emotive reaction and subsequently come up with a rationalization to
support it.116 Haidt has on his side the evolutionary biology giant, Edward
O. Wilson, who predicted in the 1970s that science would come around to
recognizing that evolution not only shaped physiology but also human
behavior. What has indeed come to pass is a body of neurological and
psychological research centering upon the parts of the human brain that
process emotional reactions.117 Researchers now know that certain reactions
having to do with what people consider moral issues activate these
emotional centers of the brain. Different cultures generate different
moralities, of course, but the cognitive sequence, Haidt concludes, is
remarkably similar across a variety of cultures: Intuitions come first,
reasoning follows behind.118 Furthermore, persuading others requires an
appeal not to the reasoning faculties of others, but to their intuitions.
Remarkably rarely does human reasoning feedback change some sort of a
113. POSNER, supra note 103, at 27 (“Another recurrent criticism of the economic approach to
law—although it is better described as a reason for the distaste with which the subject is regarded in
some quarters—is that it manifests a conservative political bias.”).
114. LYOTARD, supra note 18, at 5.
115. ROSENAU, supra note 25, at vii–viii.
116. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND 70–71 (2012).
117. Id. at 67.
118. Id. at 70–71.
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judgment about a disputable fact.119 Why do people do this? The
evolutionary psychological story is that reasoning faculties have developed
to serve human purposes that are not necessarily related to what we would
consider “truth.” They have emerged, for example, so people can obtain
power.120 Postmodernists are more correct than they ever bothered to realize
when they argue that most objective-seeming presentations are really just a
patina for a power play.
If this is true, then it becomes perfectly plausible that CBA is a posthoc rationalization to justify anti-regulatory biases. Professor Farber’s
observations of how partisan former OIRA directors have really been
ideologues121 feed perfectly into an evolutionary psychological story of how
the morality of industrial development has driven the emergence of a new
rationalization strategy called CBA.
But this account—that CBA is just a coordinated power grab—is
implausible. For one thing, there are signs that regulated interests are
beginning to sour on CBA, as more and more CBA analyses begin to show
the benefits of regulation, such as in the area of climate policy.122
Moreover, in order for this account to be true, all the work spent on refining
and debating CBA would have to be explained away as mere show. The
degree of domestic squabbling makes this implausible. Revesz and
Livermore, while arguing for greater utilization of CBA, acknowledge its
failures and propose several reforms in their book.123 Along the way, they
pointedly note that under the directorship of John Graham, CBAs at OIRA
only counted unanticipated increases in risks from regulation, but not
unanticipated decreases in risks from regulation.124 This one-sidedness is
not only revealing, it also introduces potentially huge error. For example,
reductions in sulfur dioxide achieved huge unanticipated benefits, not from
the expected reductions in acid rain, but from the health benefits of reduced

119. Id. at 44–51.
120. Id. at 88–91.
121. Farber, supra note 53, at 1362.
122. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Law and Economics, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Francesco Parisi ed.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 9),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2388883.
123. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 48, at 151–61 (discussing institutional hurdles to
debiasing CBA).
124. Id. at 58–60 (arguing that often countervailing risks are given more weight than ancillary
benefits).

2014]

The Accidental Postmodernists

57

fine particulate matter,125 which were not quantified at the time of
regulation and not considered until relatively recently.126
The volume of work dedicated to refining CBA is also hard to explain
as part of a conspiracy. Daniel Cole proposes the convening of a National
Academy of Sciences panel to develop a set of best practices that should be
expected of any CBA issued in support of or against a proposed
regulation.127 In my other work, I build upon Professor Cole’s idea by
proposing the institution of “citizen prompt letters,” which would enable
individuals to issue calls for regulation on the basis of CBAs conforming to
a well-established set of best practices.128 Matthew Adler has taken on the
distributional critiques and proposed weighting measures in CBA to assign
the welfare of poorer households a greater influence over the outcome of
CBAs,129 a proposal that has yet to provoke any reaction from
environmental postmodernists.
The environmental postmodernist challenge to CBA and its economic
underpinnings has thus served a function, though not one that the
environmental postmodernists had in mind. If the goal of environmental
postmodernism was to rid the world of CBA, they have thus far failed.
Instead, in their urgency to exterminate CBA, environmental
postmodernists have helped bring about a healthier debate about the
practice and role of CBA. Foucault would have been disappointed.
B. The Postmodernist Challenge to Science in Environmental Lawmaking
Traditional, post-structuralist postmodernist theorists have historically
had deep suspicions of the hard sciences, owing in part perhaps to
Foucault’s run-ins with the psychiatric and medical professions. But what
Foucault only implied about scientific inquiry, Jean-Francois Lyotard
charged much more bluntly. For Lyotard, developments in science in the
mid- to late-twentieth century portended not a new enlightenment, but

125. Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, The SO2 Allowance Trading System The
Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment, J. ECON. PERSP. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2124037.
126. See, e.g., Francine Laden et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate Air Pollution and Mortality
Extended Follow-up of the Harvard Six Cities Study, 173 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED.
667 (2006) (extending mortality follow-up from previous studies to 1998 to examine changes in fine
particulate air pollution).
127. Daniel Cole, Best Practice’ Standards for Regulatory Benefit-Cost Analysis, 23 RES. LAW
& ECON.: J. POL’Y 1, 3 (2007).
128. Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 433,
497–99 (2008).
129. MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION 137–45 (2012).
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simply a shift from one power-grabbing discourse to another.130 To
Lyotard, scientists were just part of another special interest group on the
take; science was just another false objectivity created as a lever of
power.131
Environmental postmodernists might not go quite so far. It is not so
much that environmental postmodernists would do away with science
altogether (as they might with economics). No one would argue that a rule
to regulate a pesticide or chemical should be driven solely by personal
values, devoid of any scientific input. But environmental postmodernists
have sounded the alarm over the pseudo-science that has hijacked the
environmental rule-making process. In that sense, there is a great deal of
ideological science in the public realm, and we are cautioned to not believe
everything we hear that bears the label “science,” or “sound science.”
Science, like economics, is infected by powerful industrial interests. Lisa
Heinzerling, in reviewing the book Bending Science,132 writes:
Science—the discipline so many of us trust to come clean with
us, to treat us squarely—has not escaped the contagion. Indeed,
in Bending Science, Professors Thomas McGarity and Wendy
Wagner detail just how thoroughly and insidiously the scientific
process can be—and repeatedly has been—“bent” to produce
results consistent with economic or ideological motives.133

Thomas McGarity and Wendy Wagner’s book Bending Science
chronicles the ways in which science has been misrepresented in court, and
by legislatures and regulatory agencies, to suit a narrow private agenda and
thwart a broader public interest.134 Significantly, McGarity and Wagner find
not only well-resourced regulated industries engaging in such shenanigans,
but also plaintiffs’ lawyers handling personal injury cases.135 But while
plaintiffs’ lawyers extract undeserved judgments and settlements, by far the
bigger problem is the widespread harm imposed by regulated industries
producing chemicals and pharmaceutical products consumed by or exposed
to an oblivious general public. Postmodern or not, it is a disquieting read.
Environmental postmodernists are very often right to sound the alarm. The
point of this Article is not to debunk environmental postmodernism, but to
130. LYOTARD, supra note 18, at 30.
131. Id.
132. THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL
INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH (2008).
133. Lisa Heinzerling, Violent Science, 87 TEX. L. REV. 623, 623 (2009).
134. MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 132, at 2.
135. Id. at 80.

2014]

The Accidental Postmodernists

59

observe how we go about settling the difficult epistemological issues that
inevitably arise in complex environmental problems. McGarity and Wagner
are accidental postmodernists because they pose concerns with the authority
of science as it is presented in the regulatory context.
But that begs the question of exactly how lawmaking can effectively
incorporate science, given the failures thus far. Unsurprisingly, some of the
proposed solutions suggested by McGarity and Wagner require lawyers.
But some of their proposals are aimed at greater transparency.
Transparency measures deserve more attention, as it is hard to see why
anyone, even a postmodernist, would object to greater transparency.
While environmental postmodernists opposing CBA have almost
exclusively been environmental advocates and lawyers, those agitating over
the role of science in public policy have been more diverse. Significantly, a
group of people skeptical of the urgency of climate change (commonly
labeled as “climate skeptics”) have complained bitterly about how the
science of climate change has been hijacked by climate scientists and used
to promote an agenda of environmental extremism. I consider much of this
movement environmentally postmodern. Consistent with postmodernist
tendencies, climate skeptics have argued that a hidden agenda is at work:
Not only does a left-wing faction wish to promote a climate agenda, but
also one of environmental radicalism with a hidden agenda. Climate change
is just a Trojan horse by which radical environmentalists hope to achieve a
broader political victory.136
At bottom, both economics and science are inaccessible to most
laypersons, including lawyers. Knowledge is power, and when an
information asymmetry exists, one can expect it to be exploited for private
gain. CBA is inaccessible to non-economists, and the postmodern view is
that certain economists exploit this esoteric knowledge for a narrow private
gain. Science can also be inaccessible, even among peer scientists—this is
the complaint of environmental postmodernists. If conducted
unscrupulously and opaquely, a broader scientific community can be as
disenfranchised as laypersons. The environmental postmodern objection is
thus concerned with the power imbalance that is generated by an
information imbalance. Even among experts, a scientific metanarrative can
run amok.
This section sets out what environmental postmodernism has to say
about science in the regulatory context. It draws heavily upon and critically
analyzes Wagner’s earlier work on toxic risk regulation, The Science

136. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
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Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation,137 and other seminal works examining
the role of science in public policy, including Sheila Jasanoff’s Fifth
Branch.
1. Funding Science to Bend It
One of the more troubling problems reported by McGarity and Wagner
involves the potential for funding considerations to influence the outcome
of scientific studies or, worse still, to completely drive the direction and
outcome of entire programs of scientific research.138 Their compilation of
stories of manipulation paints a grim picture of the role of science in the
public lawmaking process: how private firms attacked the integrity and
competence of scientists presenting inconvenient health and environmental
research; how they otherwise managed to hide inconvenient research; how
they used public relations strategies to “spin” research; and how they used
their resource advantage to create entire research agendas friendly to their
industrial interests.139 Their work in turn builds upon work by Sheila
Jasanoff, who first critically examined the ways in which science was used
as an input into public lawmaking processes.140
Empirical research unambiguously shows that industry-sponsored
research is more likely to produce results favorable to the sponsoring
industry than independently funded research.141 This is intuitive and
unsurprising. But the problem identified by environmental postmodernists
is much wider and more profound. Sponsorship of individual research
projects is too clumsily overt. So regulated industries set up shop
completely outside of the traditional academy of research and recruit
scientists by offering better pay.142 Pharmaceutical companies, for example,
can avoid the scrutiny and disclosure requirements imposed by universities
and medical schools by contracting directly with medical researchers.143 On
the trend towards sponsored research more generally, McGarity and
Wagner write:
137. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1613, 1617–19 (1995) [hereinafter Wagner, Science Charade].
138. MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 132, at 80.
139. Id. at 60–204.
140. JASANOFF, supra note 101, at 14.
141. MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 132, at 22 (citing Justin E. Bekelman, Yan Li, & Cary
P. Gross, Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 289 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 454, 455 (2003)).
142. Id. at 84 (“By generously supporting a small cadre of scientists whose work supports their
economic interests, sponsors succeed in shaping science by increasing their productivity, potentially
well beyond what it would have been without that support.”).
143. Id. at 69.
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Taking full advantage of the opportunity that sponsored research
offers to call the piper’s tune, manufacturers occasionally pool
their resources in “research centers” that are structured to fund a
number of individual research projects. The centers typically
resemble government research agencies or private foundations,
and they often employ the traditional model of soliciting and
approving research proposals from interested researchers in
academia or the private sector.144

With these sponsored research enterprises bearing a resemblance to
non-profit, non-partisan, and philanthropic research organizations, it
becomes difficult for the consuming public and lawmakers to discern the
objectivity and legitimacy of science. As McGarity and Wagner point out, it
does not matter if this science is so manipulated that it ceases to be science;
what matters is that policymakers and the general public are unable to
discern the difference.145
A world and a generation away, post-structuralist postmodernists have
long been lamenting that funding pressures have always driven science.
Even Rene Descartes ran into funding problems.146 And the more general
concern with the subtler influences of money was first articulated by
Lyotard before being chronicled by McGarity, Wagner, and Jasanoff:
Capitalism solves the scientific problem of research funding in its
own way: directly by financing research departments in private
companies, in which demands for performativity and
recommercialization orient research first and foremost toward
technological “applications”; and indirectly by creating private,
state, or mixed-sector research foundations that grant program
subsidies to university departments, research laboratories, and
independent research groups with no expectation of an immediate
147
return on the results of the work . . . .

That money talks is hardly news, and the collision of influence
peddling with the ascendance of science as an input into public lawmaking
has perhaps been inevitable for a long time. Postmodernists do not have a
monopoly on this worry. But the environmental postmodern objection is
more developed than simply “the fix is in.” The environmental postmodern
144. Id. at 80.
145. Id. at 59.
146. LYOTARD, supra note 18, at 44–45 (“By the end of the Discourse on Method, Descartes is
already asking for laboratory funds. . . . No money, no proof—and that means no verification of
statements and no truth.”).
147. Id. at 45.
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objection highlights structural factors that would elude the simpler rentseeking accounts.148 It is the relationship between power and false
objectivity that is the hallmark of postmodern agitation. Financial
influences and public choice theory may explain the reason for rentseeking, but postmodernism can explain the more interesting mechanism by
which it is accomplished.
2. Science Wielding Power
The postmodern account is about power masquerading as authority.
The authority can be the promise of neutrality. The authority of science,
however, derives from its promise of knowledge of a greater universality.
Gravitational forces are the same no matter where on earth they are tested;
aspirin works on people of all races, cultures, and ages. The replicability of
scientific “facts” is what makes scientific predictions reliable and useful for
public lawmaking. Answers about the harmfulness of a toxic chemical need
to be correct and need to be applicable to a wide range of humans or other
life forms.
For a postmodernist, the esoteric nature of scientific knowledge creates
a power imbalance. The power imbalance derives from the implicit
authority of scientists to define their own domain. Fortunately for scientists,
the vast majority of the world is ill-equipped to challenge scientists on their
claims.149 But in order for the knowledge imbalance to translate into a
power imbalance, scientists must establish that their knowledge is better
than other forms of knowledge. If an environmental activist expresses a fear
148. “Rents” are meant in economic parlance to be those excess, or above-normal returns on
some asset. Rents are understood to exist in all kinds of markets, but most accounts of rent-seeking posit
that law and government policy create rents, and rent-seeking is the attempt by private parties to capture
those rents. See, e.g., Robert D. Tollison, Rent-Seeking A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575, 575–76 (1982)
(defining “rent” and “rent-seeking”). A common premise is that rent-seeking is an activity that involves
some distortion of government policy so that private rents are increased, but social welfare is decreased.
Such is the case when private firms lobby government bodies and officials for policy favorable to a
private interest that is not necessarily social welfare increasing. Lobbying is the paradigmatic rentseeking activity and sometimes takes on the even less savory activity of outright bribery. See, e.g.,
Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Schleifer, & Rovert W. Vishny, Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?,
83 AM. ECON. REV. 409, 409 (1993) (“[R]ent-seeking, particularly public rent-seeking by government
officials, is likely to hurt innovative activities more than everyday production. Since innovation drives
economic growth, public rent-seeking hampers growth more severely than production.”); Anne O.
Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 291–92 (1974)
(discussing rent-seeking activities, “including bribery, hiring relatives of officials or employing the
officials themselves”).
149. Sheldon Ungar, Knowledge, Ignorance and the Popular Culture Climate Change Versus
the Ozone Hole, 9 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 297, 302 (2000). Jasanoff reported that 80% of the
American general public lacks a working knowledge of basic science. JASANOFF, supra note 101, at 209
(citing NAT’L SCI. BD., SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 200 (1993)).
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that a certain pesticide will cause him harm, a scientific response must
resort to something more universal than fear. Scientists will, in the
postmodern account, helpfully remind us that they have a better, more
universal, and more reliable form of knowledge:
The scientist questions the validity of narrative statements and
concludes that they are never subject to argumentation or proof.
He classifies them as belonging to a different mentality: savage,
primitive, underdeveloped, backward, alienated, composed of
opinions, customs, authority, prejudice, ignorance, ideology.
Narratives are fables, myths, legends, fit only for women and
children. At best, attempts are made to throw some rays of light
into this obscurantism, to civilize, educate, develop.150

Polemics aside, this is a consistent theme in French postmodernism. As
noted in Part II.A.2 above, French postmodernists are clearly fixated on a
perceived condescension from certain professional groups.151 But this
condescension has a purpose: The higher platform must be defended from
intruders. Maintaining authority requires policing the boundaries of what is
“science” and what is not. As discussed above, Sheila Jasanoff explores the
role of “boundary work,” in which scientists define the boundaries of their
expertise, and more significantly, their membership, which enjoys exclusive
license to practice under the authority of their subfields of science.152 This
boundary drawing is fundamental because only by limiting entry into a
group can the group preserve its credibility, maintain sufficient opaqueness
to preserve its authority, and maintain the ability to control the output of its
members. Central to the concern with the capture of science raised by
environmental postmodernists are the function of scientific communities as
their own gatekeepers and the willingness of modern societies to allow
them a fair amount of autonomy in policing their own ranks. Left to
effective self-regulation,153 scientific communities can create and maintain
authority simply by restricting entry into their ranks.
While the postmodern attack on science tends to be not so much on the
professional scientists themselves but on the way that they have fallen prey
to outside influences, the environmental postmodern complaint clearly
identifies the existence of a subset of scientists that have been allowed to
wield power under the banner of their scientific subfields. These renegade
150. LYOTARD, supra, note 18, at 27 (internal citations omitted).
151. See supra Part II.A.2.
152. JASANOFF, supra note 101, at 14. Jasanoff credits sociologist Thomas Gieryn with coining
the phrase “boundary work” and making the initial identification and analysis of the practice. Id.
153. MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 132, at 46.
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scientists may not constitute a majority in their scientific subfields, but they
are likely to wield outsized influence over the science that is deployed in a
public lawmaking process. McGarity and Wagner focus on applied research
that is narrowly directed toward specific applied questions of policy
relevance—what they call “policy-relevant science”154 and what Jasanoff
calls “regulatory science.”155 The reason that special interest groups are able
to capture policy-relevant science is because it tends not to be the kind of
cutting-edge science for which scientists are rewarded with recognition
within the academy. So the best researchers do not tend to gravitate towards
policy-relevant science.156 At the same time, special interest groups are
intensely interested in policy-relevant science, and are willing to expend
significant resources to develop it and to “bend” it to suit their private
ends.157 So “the boring work of pesticide toxicity testing” is left to those
who will do science for pay.158 Scientific communities thus become cleaved
into policy-relevant science and everything else, and it is this former subrealm of science that becomes the instrument of special interest groups.
How do policy-relevant scientists wield power? Like other closed
shops, they do boundary work, restrict their membership, and control their
messaging to maintain authority in the public lawmaking process. Despite
the fact that those performing policy-relevant science are nominally
members of a larger and more legitimate scientific community, the low
academic stakes of policy-relevant science drives out potential dissenters.
Top researchers who are truly independent shy away from peer review of
policy-relevant research, as not only is it of low academic interest, but it is
vigorously policed by interested parties. A negative review can be expected
to be met by venomous attacks that injure the reputation of the researcher.
The regular practice of attacking creates an ex ante disincentive to wade
into a question over policy-relevant science.159 The incentives are thus
designed to drive out dissenters and maintain a tightly knit scientific subcommunity with a narrow special purpose. In this and other ways, policyrelevant scientists carefully control their messaging.
Discrediting scientists who dare to interfere with the sciencemessaging mission is child’s play for an organized group. Simply spinning
and labeling are important strategies for sowing doubt about certain

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 11.
JASANOFF, supra note 101, at 76–77.
MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 132, at 47.
Id. at 60–96.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 160.
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research and certain people.160 The label “junk science” has been used to
devastating effect, while appeals to “sound science” are applied to advance
favored results.161 The postmodernist insight is that this is about drawing
boundaries and implicitly creating a power differential: Those who do
“sound science” are scientists, and those who peddle “junk science” are not.
Scientists have authority; junk scientists do not.162
The peer review process, intended to protect the integrity of science,
can be similarly employed. The idea of peer review is that scientific
research is only published after objective, disinterested, and expert
reviewers give it a stamp of approval, certifying the quality and accuracy of
the research findings.163 But, as a postmodernist would confidently predict,
like other mechanisms portrayed as objective and neutral, peer review
becomes an instrument of power. The peer review process still requires the
selection of reviewers, and the selection of friendly reviewers is always a
strong possibility in the small intimate community of researchers.164
Moreover, the lower public attention, shorter timelines and limited
resources for the review of policy-relevant science all point to the
susceptibility of the peer review process to be used as a tool.165 Rather than
the neutral gatekeeper that it was meant to be, peer review is, as
environmental postmodernists submit, a way for a cadre of policy-relevant
scientists to build and maintain “cognitive authority,” and to defend it from
dissenters.166
Perhaps most significantly for postmodernists, the peer review process
is a mechanism for boundary line drawing. In fact, the primary function of
peer review is to police the boundary between quality science and “junk
science.” The peer review process is one in which editorial decisions can
subtly or obviously influence outcomes.167 In the policy-relevant world

160. Manufacturing companies discrediting scientists who make embarrassing scientific
findings about their products has unfortunately become common. See, e.g., Rachel Aviv, A Valuable
Reputation, NEW YORKER, Feb. 10, 2014, at 52, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2014/02/10/a-valuable-reputation (describing how an agribusiness company discredited science on the
harmful effects of one of the company’s herbicides).
161. Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 137, at 1628.
162. Id.
163. Wendy E. Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction Reclaiming the Debate in the Role of
Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 95 (2003)
[hereinafter Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction] (“Scientific peer review is supposed to consist of
unbiased external review by those trained in the scientific method.”).
164. JASANOFF, supra note 101, at 81.
165. Id. at 82.
166. Id. at 83.
167. Id. at 68.
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then, it would surprise no one that peer review is sometimes used to do the
bidding for special interest groups seeking to discredit research.168
The collective scientific illiteracy of the general populace169 invites a
power grab. Even for those that spend significant chunks of their
professional life following the science of climate change, the problem still
boils down to, as one science sociologist put it, “picking the experts you
think you can trust.”170 In fact, even lawmakers and administrators have
found it necessary to allow scientists to self-govern. In such a situation, it is
perhaps inevitable that policy-relevant scientists should wield power in a
fashion predicted by postmodernists.
3. Science as a Social Construct
What makes science so indeterminate in a regulatory system so
devoted to insuring its reliability?171 Bending with funding is possible
because of a pervasive and unfortunate myth that science can be firewalled
from the influences of politics and special interest groups seeking favorable
regulatory policy. This myth, argue the environmental postmodernists,
induces rational agencies, industrial interests, and even non-profit
environmental organizations to seek to capture the exalted mantle of
science to wield over the policy world.172 Were we to dispense with the
myth that science somehow offers the objectivity needed to arbitrate policy
disputes, then we could see science for what it is: just another social
construct (goes the postmodern argument).
Wagner argues in her earlier work that when lawmakers mandate
scientific input into lawmaking decisions, the nature of the input is really
“trans-scientific”—inherently a blend of science and policy. Science in the
public policy process is thus at least partially a social construct and
representations of science as objective and free of influence are
misleading.173 Similarly, Jasanoff writes that “[w]e have become aware of
the socially constructed nature of scientific reality and of the intermingling
of facts and values in disputes arising at the frontiers of science.”174 Sidney
Shapiro and Christopher Schroeder describe the rise of a “post-empiricist”
168. MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 132, at 140.
169. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
170. Ungar, supra note 149, at 297.
171. JASANOFF, supra note 101, at 2.
172. Id. at 12–13; MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 132, at 2–3.
173. Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 137, at 1619–28 (“Although trans-scientific
questions cannot be answered by science, they generally appear to outside observers to be resolvable by
contemporary science and thus are often mistaken for straightforward scientific questions.”).
174. JASANOFF, supra note 101, at vii.
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movement, which questions whether science generates an objective
description of reality.175 The idea that science is somehow above the fray is
thus a “myth.”176
In fact, the traditional post-structuralist postmodernists posit exactly
that. The French postmodernist tradition would tell us that it is a charade to
separate the possession of specialized knowledge and the exercise of power.
As Lyotard wrote:
[K]nowledge and power are simply two sides of the same
question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what
needs to be decided?177

According to the postmodern account, if science is of epistemic value but is
not freely available, then somebody has to decide when something is or is
not “science.” This is French postmodernism packaged for the
administrative state that relies on policy-relevant science. The account is
strikingly similar to the claims made by Jasanoff, who wrote:
[S]cientific “facts” are, for the most part, socially constructed.
We regard a particular factual claim as true not because it
accurately reflects what is out there in nature, but because it has
been certified as true by those who are considered competent to
pass upon the truth and falsity of that kind of claim.178

Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions179 provides a
seminal account of how and when wide bodies of scientific knowledge give
way to new theories and scientific “facts.” Kuhn describes how beliefs by a
critical mass of scientists can abruptly shift from one body of theory to
another—giving rise to the popularized phrase “paradigm-shifting”—and
change a field of science virtually overnight. It is this unnerving historically
recurrent pattern that undermines claims that science presents bedrock
knowledge.
Nor does the peer review process deliver the objectivity that lawmakers
and the public have, perhaps unrealistically, come to expect from it. The
inherent social construction of science renders the peer review process
nearly impossible to scrub clean of bias. It is not so much the fraud, bias,
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 16, at 442–43.
Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 137, at 1628.
LYOTARD, supra note 18, at 8–9.
JASANOFF, supra note 101, at 12–13.
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE 8 (Otto Neurath et al. eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 2d ed. 1970).
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sexism, institutional bias, and outright incompetence in peer review that are
troubling;180 it is the reality that the process and the outcomes of peer
review are inextricably intertwined with social objectives.181
Environmental and post-structuralist postmodernists thus share
skepticism of the deference bestowed upon scientists. The environmental
postmodern account is more sophisticated than that offered up by poststructuralists, who have embarrassed themselves by revealing some
fundamental misunderstandings of scientific concepts.182 But environmental
postmodernists have (unconsciously) followed the lead of their poststructuralist forerunners in attempting to deconstruct scientific claims and
blur the boundaries that scientists have worked hard to establish and
maintain.
C. Environmental Postmodernism from Climate Skeptics
Recalling the origins of postmodernism—Foucault’s struggles with
powerful and prestigious medical and psychiatric professions—serves to
underscore postmodernism’s origins in anti-establishment, counter-trend
tendencies.183 This has struck a chord in an environmental movement that

180. See, e.g., Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction, supra note 163, at 95 (“Over the years,
there has been considerable discontent with the peer-review process, much of it related to concern over
the lack of objectivity of those doing the reviews. Even matters as seemingly insignificant as the
affiliation or fame of the researcher can affect the outcome of peer reviews.”). Many instances are
chronicled by Sheila Jasanoff. See JASANOFF, supra note 101, at 61–83.
181. See JASANOFF, supra note 101, at 68 (“[E]ven in the bastions of scientific research and
publication, peer review serves a mixed and multiple function. Although its primary purpose is to
provide quality assurance, peer review is also used more or less consciously by both editors and granting
agencies to further social objectives, from upholding a funding program’s legislative mission to
providing support for litigation.”).
182. See, e.g., ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMONT, FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN
INTELLECTUALS’ ABUSE OF SCIENCE 7 (1998) (“[T]hese texts contain much more than mere ‘errors’:
they display a profound indifference, if not a disdain, for facts and logic.”). It should be noted that Sokal
has a history of clashing with postmodernists, beginning with an article he submitted as a hoax to the
postmodernist journal Social Text pretending to argue that physics was, just like literature, inherently
subjectivist and just another “form of epistemic relativism.” Alan Sokal, Transgressing the Boundaries
Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity, 14 SOC. TEXT 217 (1996). However, even
more measured critics of postmodernism also take postmodernists to task for fundamental
misunderstandings. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 20, at 37; SLINGERLAND, supra note 40, at 107–08
(mocking postmodernist Bruno Latour’s idealized and misinformed understanding of Chinese history).
183. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 20, at 56 (“Postmodernists . . . adapt Foucauldian arguments
to show the ways in which discourses of power are used in all societies to marginalize subordinate
groups. For such discourses of power do not just contribute to the decentring and deconstruction of the
self; they also serve to marginalize those people who do not partake in them.”).
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has also traditionally been suspicious of consolidated power.184 But at the
risk of sounding postmodernist, what is “the establishment”?
From the political right comes a new environmental postmodernism: a
challenge to what has become a mainstream establishment of climate
scientists. While a vast majority of scientific researchers have coalesced
around a belief that climate change represents a very serious risk, an
agitating minority of climate skeptics claim that the mainstream science is
wrong, manipulated, and a power play to seize the reins of power by
invoking the emergency of climate change.185
Why should we be surprised? Environmental postmodernists have
argued that science has always been a social construct, and if it is a social
construct incapable of stable, objective meaning, then it is susceptible of
hijacking. This climate skeptic postmodernism comes not only from a
small, but vocal group of climate researchers, but also skeptical laypersons
unafraid to weigh in on matters in which they have an expertise
disadvantage. Climate postmodernists have attempted to counter their
expertise disadvantage the same way that postmodernists and
environmental postmodernists have in the past: They have tried to change
the subject. When confronted with authority, postmodernists will always
question authority’s objectivity, thereby challenging its legitimacy. It does
not hurt that climate postmodernists enjoy financial backing from the Koch
brothers,186 the fourth-richest individuals in the United States.187
It seems safe to say that most climate skeptics would be even less
inclined than environmental postmodernists to identify with the antiestablishment, liberal political positions heretofore associated with
postmodernism. But a cadre of scientists do see themselves as an oppressed
minority in their policy world of interested climate change researchers.
Non-scientific climate skeptics have taken up their grievance in earnest.
Throughout their calls to question or reject the prevailing climate science,
climate skeptics rail against the larger, better-funded, mainstream
community of climate scientists who call for policy action to arrest climate
184. See, e.g., OPIE, supra note 1, at 426 (discussing the emergence of radical environmental
non-governmental organizations); Samuel P. Hays, From Conservation to Environment Environmental
Politics in the United States Since World War II, in OUT OF THE WOODS: ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
HISTORY 101, 123 (Char Miller & Hal Rothman eds., 1997) (noting suspicions of governmental
initiatives as well as private development).
185. See infra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, Koch Pledge Tied to Congressional Climate Inaction, NEW YORKER
(June 30, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/07/the-kochs-and-the-actionon-global-warming.html; see also supra note 10.
187. Forbes 400 The Richest People in America 2014, FORBES), http://www.forbes.com/forbes400/ (last updated Sept. 29, 2014).
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change. The climate skeptic community has done so in ways and with
rhetoric that sounds surprisingly like the environmental postmodernists who
oppose CBA and harbor doubts about the soundness of policy-relevant
science, and generally have the opposite set of worries of climate skeptics
and the Koch brothers.
1. Funding Climate Science to Bend It
A common complaint levied by climate skeptics is that mainstream
climate scientists have rigged the federal grant-making process to direct
research funds only to like-minded researchers. According to climate
skeptics, climate science has become dogmatic, so that what is considered
credible enough for research funds is defined by what the mainstream
climate scientists themselves define as being “credible.” The awarding of
research funds inherently requires some gatekeeping, lest scarce federal
research dollars be wasted. Climate skeptics assert that this gatekeeping
function has been captured.
Importantly, climate skeptics do not necessarily claim that it is
ideology per se that motivates mainstream climate scientists. According to
climate skeptics, it is power, and the concomitant flow of money, that is
supposedly sought. By trumpeting the dire risks of climate change, climate
scientists are, in the climate skeptic story, alarming politicians and the
general public into devoting more dollars to climate research.188
Roy Spencer, an atmospheric sciences professor at the University of
Alabama at Huntsville and a climate researcher and skeptic, writes in his
blog Global Warming:
But what DOES exist is a large organization that has a virtual
monopoly on global warming research in the U.S., and that has a
vested interest in AGW [anthropogenic global warming] theory
being true: the U.S. Government. The idea that governmentfunded climate research is unbiased is laughable. The push for
ever increasing levels of government regulation and legislation,
the desire of government managers to grow their programs, the
dependence of congressional funding of a problem on the
188. Richard S. Lindzen, Global Warming The Origin and Nature of the Alleged Scientific
Consensus, REGULATION, Spring 1992, at 87, 91 [hereinafter Lindzen, Global Warming] (“Those
lobbying groups have budgets of several hundred million dollars and employ about 50,000 people; their
support is highly valued by many political figures. As with any large groups, self-perpetuation becomes
a crucial concern. “Global warming” has become one of the major battle cries in their fundraising
efforts. At the same time, the media unquestioningly accept the pronouncements of those groups as
objective truth.”).
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existence of a “problem” to begin with, and the U.N.’s desire to
find reasons to move toward global governance, all lead to
inherent bias in climate research.189

This climate skeptic complaint is that a problem has been concocted so
climate scientists can, with the assistance of funding, undertake a massive
taxpayer-funded research effort under the guise of rescuing us from our
folly. Climate scientists are not any more immune from funding problems
than Descartes, about which Lyotard remarked: “[n]o money, no proof—
and that means no verification of statements and no truth.”190 This is the
same complaint from climate skeptic Richard Lindzen, who writes:
Even in the 19th Century, most scientists needed institutional
homes, and today science almost inevitably requires outside
funding. In some fields, including climate, the government has
essentially a monopoly on such funding.191

Under the postmodern complaint propounded by climate skeptics then,
climate science is just another device for obtaining funding. This would not
be possible without the creation of some source of authority, which climate
scientists have created with their esoteric (but sprawling) research into the
science of climate change.
2. Climate Scientists Wielding Power
As noted above, environmental postmodernists have argued that
scientists draw boundaries. Scientists doing policy-relevant research draw
boundaries to legitimize their own science and to discredit science reaching
contrary conclusions, and they are not shy about using the peer review
process for those purposes. This complaint is almost perfectly mirrored by
climate skeptics: their most consistent complaint is that mainstream climate
scientists have ruthlessly drawn boundaries and excluded dissenters. Patrick
Michaels, a climate skeptic, has argued:
The result of all this is that our refereed literature has been
inestimably damaged, and reputations have been trashed. Mr.
Wigley repeatedly tells news reporters not to listen to “skeptics”
189. Roy W. Spencer, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, GLOBAL WARMING
(Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.drroyspencer.com/2011/01/why-most-published-research-findings-are-false/.
190. LYOTARD, supra note 18, at 44–45.
191. Richard S. Lindzen, Science in the Public Square Global Climate Alarmism and Historical
Precedents, 18 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 70, 70 (2013) [hereinafter Lindzen, Public Square].
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(or even nonskeptics like me), because they didn’t publish
enough in the peer-reviewed literature—even as he and his
friends sought to make it difficult or impossible to do so.192

Richard Lindzen has written:
Although there are many reasons why some scientists might want
to bring their field into the public square, the cases described here
appear, instead, to be cases in which those with political agendas
found it useful to employ science. This immediately involves a
distortion of science at a very basic level: namely, science
becomes a source of authority rather than a mode of inquiry. The
real utility of science stems from the latter; the political utility
stems from the former.193

This passage could have been written by Lyotard himself, so perfect is the
parallelism between Lyotard’s skepticism and Lindzen’s cynicism. At the
core of both complaints is the underlying premise that there is no inherent
utility to the scientific endeavor, only the seeking of artificially-created
rents.
Ross McKitrick, a Canadian economist who has devoted a large part of
his scholarly output to casting doubt on climate change, has also remarked
on what he perceives as the dual practices of censoring by peer review and
intimidation by editorial fiat:
In the end, the paper was accepted for publication, but not in a
climatology journal. Fortunately for me, I am an economist, not a
climatologist, and my career doesn’t depend on getting published
in climatology journals. If I were a young climatologist, I would
have learned that my career prospects would be much better if I
never wrote papers that question the IPCC. The skewing of the
literature (and careers) can only be bad for society, which
depends on scientists and the scientific literature for trustworthy
194
advice for wise policy decisions.

192. Patrick J. Michaels, How to Manufacture a Climate Consensus The East Anglia Emails
Are Just The Tip of The Iceberg. I Should Know, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2009, 10:45 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704398304574598230426037244.
193. Lindzen, Public Square, supra note 191, at 70.
194. Ross McKitrick, Bias in the Peer Review Process A Cautionary and Personal Account, in
CLIMATE COUP: GLOBAL WARMING’S INVASION OF OUR GOVERNMENT AND OUR LIVES 69, 71 (Patrick
J. Michaels ed., 2011).
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No institution has been the target of more accusations than the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Formed by the United
Nations to periodically assemble hundreds of the most active and prominent
climate researchers in the world, the IPCC produces a report every few
years that reviews and synthesizes the literature on the science and policy of
climate change.195 A gatekeeping function is thus implicit in the IPCC’s
function. Synthesizing literature implicitly requires judgment, which
requires accepting some research and rejecting other research.
Consistent with a postmodern view, the IPCC is thus very much a
social and political body. Although scientific judgments should form the
bedrock criteria for developing a literature review, some subjectivity must
unavoidably creep in. To preserve its authority, the IPCC has strived to
create the appearance of objectivity. It has included climate skeptics in its
worldwide body of climate scientists that prepare its periodical reports,
including Richard Lindzen, one of the most vituperative critics of climate
science.196 Despite these efforts, climate skeptics remain highly critical of
the IPCC. John Christy, a colleague of Roy Spencer at the University of
Alabama at Huntsville and another dissenting climate scientist, has written:
Selected lead authors have the last word in the review cycle and
so control the message, often ignoring or marginalizing
dissenting comments. ‘Consensus’ and manufactured-confidence
ensued.197

Spencer himself has echoed that complaint:
[The IPCC] is primarily a political advocacy group that cloaks
itself in the aura of scientific respectability while it cherry-picks
the science that best supports its desired policy outcomes, and

195. Reports,
IPCC,
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_
reports.shtml (last visited Nov 23, 2014); see also Organization, IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/
organization/organization.shtml (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
196. See, e.g., Lindzen, Global Warming, supra note 188, at 91 (“Despite the fact that those
remarks were virtually meaningless, they led the environmental advocacy movement to adopt the issue
immediately.”); Marc Morano, MIT Climate Scientist Dr. Richard Lindzen Rips UN IPCC Report,
CLIMATE DEPOT (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.climatedepot.com/2013/09/28/mit-climate-scientist-drrichard-lindzen-rips-un-ipcc-report-the-latest-ipcc-report-has-truly-sunk-to-level-of-hilariousincoherence-it-is-quite-amazing-to-see-the-contortions-the-ipcc-has/ (“I think that the latest IPCC report
has truly sunk to level of hilarious incoherence.”).
197. John R. Christy, IPCC Cherish It, Tweak It, or Scrap It? 463 NATURE 730, 732 (2010).
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marginalizes or ignores science that might contradict the party
line.198

In 2011, the United States House of Representatives voted to deny
funding to the IPCC for preparation of its climate reports.199 We should not
be surprised that criticism of the IPCC rises monotonically with its
influence. And we should not be surprised that attempts by the IPCC to
answer criticism are Sisyphean: The harder it tries to appear objective, the
greater its authority, and hence the greater the postmodern objection. It is
no doubt true that the IPCC indirectly, but palpably, influences funding
decisions. The ingredients for a postmodern objection are present: authority
based on the pretense of objectivity in science, boundary-drawing, and raw
bullying. Are these not the ingredients of postmodernism?
One might engage in a thought experiment of imagining a legion of
French researchers investigating the nature of sexual preferences in the
1940s and 1950s. What would their reception in the French academy look
like? Would their articles be marginalized in the way that climate skeptics
say theirs have been marginalized? The merits of the objection are beside
the point. Regardless of the merits of climate science and climate
skepticism, I argue in this Article that there is a power relationship and a
power dynamic that would look very familiar to a postmodernist.
3. Climate Science as a Social Construct
Perhaps most fundamentally, a strain of climate skepticism has reached
into a more philosophical realm to express doubt about the innate
knowability of climate science. Just as Sheila Jasanoff has argued that
science is a social construction,200 climate skeptics have argued that climate
science is inherently a social construction, and only illusory in its stated
transcendence of petty politics and lesser forms of knowledge. Some
climate skeptics have very consciously raised postmodernist objections in
urging skepticism towards climate science. David Demeritt, a geography
professor, has even invoked postmodernists, such as Baudrillard, in
attempting to strip climate science of its authority:
198. ROY W. SPENCER, THE GREAT GLOBAL WARMING BLUNDER: HOW MOTHER NATURE
FOOLED THE WORLD’S TOP CLIMATE SCIENTISTS, at xiv (2012).
199. H.R. 680, 112th Cong. § 4042 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112hr680ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr680ih.pdf; 157 CONG. REC. H1202 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2011) (“The House
passed H.R. 1, making appropriations for the Department of Defense and the other departments and
agencies of the Government for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2011, by a yea-and-nay vote of
235 yeas to 189 nays, Roll No. 147.”).
200. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
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Impressed by science’s spectacular capacity to represent,
simulate, and construct nature through such practices as
computer modeling and genetic engineering, some social
constructionists, following Baudrillard (1983), have posited the
total eclipse of the real and the natural by the virtual and artificial
within a new, hyper-real society of the simulacra . . . . By
unmasking the heterogeneous and contingent social relations
involved in the practice of science, this form of social
construction is directed against “certain pictures of reality, truth,
discovery, and necessity” and the scientistic “ideology
201
of . . . pious reverence” for science these metaphysics produce.

The most fundamental argument that climate skeptics make is the deepest
one: Climate science is subject to an innate unknowability—a known
unknown, to borrow from the former Defense Secretary202—such that
attempts to make the science more objective are inherently doomed to fail:
In all of human history, what was believed and promoted by the
majority of service intellectuals (high priests) in each civilization
was only created and maintained to support the hierarchy and the
place of the high priests within the hierarchy. To believe that the
present is any different regarding any issue managed by our
“experts”, whether in medicine, psychology, cosmology,
economics, law and governance, population health or ecology, is
pure distilled idiocy.203

Also reminiscent of postmodernist objection is climate skeptics’
warning that this power-grab is not just about the funding itself, or an
attempt to capture a limited research budget. An element of the climate
skeptic argument is that climate change is a veiled attempt to impose a
broader menu of environmental restrictions that would not have been
politically palatable otherwise. Climate skeptics have often called climate
change a “Trojan horse” in which a broader “socialist” agenda is to be
201. David Demeritt, The Construction of Global Warming and the Politics of Science, 91
ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 307, 310 (2001) (quoting IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 60, 62 (1999)).
202. DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Feb. 12,
2002, 11:30 AM), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636 (“[T]here are
known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to
say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones
we don't know we don't know.”).
203. Denis G. Rancourt, On the Gargantuan Lie of Climate Change Science, ACTIVIST
TEACHER (Mar. 21, 2011, 9:15 PM), http://activistteacher.blogspot.com/2011/03/on-gargantuan-lie-ofclimate-change.html.
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smuggled into a freedom-loving society.204 It is reminiscent of Lisa
Heinzerling’s argument that the Trojan horse of CBA is the vehicle in
which a political deregulatory agenda is being smuggled into the debate
about environmental protection.205
Climate skeptics, generally propounding an agenda of low energy
prices and pro-business governmental policy, are odd bedfellows indeed
with not only French, structural postmodernists, but also the more modern
and sophisticated environmental postmodernists. But recall Lyotard’s
description of postmodernism: “as incredulity towards metanarratives.”206
Suspicion, the most reliable characteristic of postmodernists, provides the
link between the environmental postmodernists and their Koch-funded
adversaries on the other side of the environmental divide.
III. THE POSTMODERNIST CONDITION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Environmental issues are uniquely frustrating from an epistemological
point of view. Uncertainty is ubiquitous. Environmental issues are uniquely
indeterminate because so many scientific questions are deeply intertwined
with social and ethical issues, further complicating decision making and
planning. Even on the single dimension of uncertainty, environmental
problems run a particularly large spectrum. Climate change takes up a
position at the far end of that spectrum.
Pervasive scientific uncertainty, combined with the entanglement of
social and ethical issues, produce confusion and discord, and create
conditions for the emergence of the kinds of people and organizations that
the post-structuralist postmodernists warned us about: information
entrepreneurs satisfying a public craving for authority by projecting
expertise and objectivity. The esoteric nature of environmental issues
204. See, e.g., Jonathan Marshall, Carbon Taxes Climate Savior or Trojan Horse?, PG&E
CURRENTS: NEWS & PERSP. FROM PACIFIC GAS & ELEC. CO. (Sept. 3, 2013),
http://www.pgecurrents.com/2013/09/03/carbon-taxes-climate-savior-or-trojan-horse/
(“Many
conservatives, who once supported pollution taxes as an efficient alternative to traditional regulations,
today either question the science of climate change or fear that carbon taxes are a Trojan Horse to
expand the size of the federal government.”); Naomi Klein, Capitalism vs. the Climate, THE NATION
(Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/164497/capitalism-vs-climate (describing a comment
at a Heartland Institute function: “[h]is question for the panelists, gathered in a Washington, DC,
Marriott Hotel in late June, is this: ‘To what extent is this entire movement simply a green Trojan horse,
whose belly is full with red Marxist socioeconomic doctrine?’”). Australian government officials have
criticized the movement to control greenhouse gas emissions as “socialism masquerading as
environmentalism.” Greg Sheridan, Climate Tax, Aid and Fees Off Table as Cabinet Toughens Stance,
THE AUSTRALIAN (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/climate/climatetax-aid-and-fees-off-table-as-cabinet-toughens-stance/story-e6frg6xf-1226756955449.
205. See supra note 49.
206. See supra note 18.
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exacerbates this postmodernist dynamic by creating vast differences among
individuals in their sophistication and their ability to evaluate the veracity
of environmental information. Where information asymmetries exist,
people with more information have power, and power will find money, or
better yet, more power. The stakes of environmental conflict can be
enormous—trillions of dollars in the case of climate change207—so that
private interests have strong incentives to deploy skillful information
entrepreneurs.
But where does that leave us? If the thrust of environmental
postmodernism is to reject the economically-motivated reform efforts and
to cast a skeptical eye towards policy-relevant science, then what is the way
forward? Can environmental postmodernists suggest an alternative?
A. The Postmodernist Problem with Environmental Postmodernism
It would be unfair to say that environmental postmodernists have never
proposed any alternatives to skepticism, a critique that has been devastating
to post-structuralist postmodernism. The problem is that environmental
postmodernists have done exactly what they accuse their nemeses of doing:
trying to grab power. That this occurs unwittingly is perhaps the cleverest
contribution of postmodernism.
Amy Sinden has argued for a framework based on power imbalances to
inform environmental law- and policy-making. Her article In Defense of
Absolutes208 draws on Ronald Dworkin’s work on “trumps” as the basis for
arguing for the use of absolute environmental rights to counter a
fundamental political power imbalance.209 Analogizing from constitutional
rights that trump other policy priorities, Sinden uses the seemingly
inflexible mandates of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to illustrate what
she means by absolute rights.210 The ESA also provides examples of large
political power imbalances, and Sinden argues that this is an application of
her principle of empowering a historically weak interest: the
environment.211 Similarly, in Climate Change and Human Rights,212
207. Damage estimates are of course controversial, but a study by the Stockholm Environment
Institute estimates the damage to oceans alone will be about $2 trillion per year by 2100. STOCKHOLM
ENV’T INST., VALUING THE OCEAN: DRAFT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (2012), available at
http://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/SEI-PreviewValuingTheOcean-DraftExecutiveSummary.pdf.
208. Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes, supra note 62.
209. Id. at 1470–72.
210. Id. at 1412–13.
211. See id. at 1507–11 (“If the problem is power imbalance, then maybe an absolute standard
that privileges environmental protection over all else—that deems economic costs irrelevant and
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Professor Sinden laments a power imbalance that on her account,
contributes to potentially disastrous inaction on climate change. Sinden’s
prescription is for a discourse more centered upon human rights than
economic efficiency.213 Sinden’s analogy between the harms to human
civilizations large and small, with other, better-recognized violations of
basic human dignities, finds some support in the existence of two actual
cases involving harms from climate change.214
Lisa Heinzerling argues that debates over environmental issues are
obscured by the use of CBA and the indulgence of economic analyses.215
Recall that her objection to CBA and like economic analyses is the false
objectivity insinuated by dollars and cents.216 But her prescription is to keep
environmental discourse focused on “values,” lest it be waylaid by the siren
song of numerical precision and objectivity.217
But the same criticisms made by Sinden and Heinzerling can be
leveled at their own proposals. Without acknowledging the epistemological
tradeoffs, Sinden, Heinzerling, and environmental postmodernists argue for
a deontological approach, and argue that it will produce better outcomes.
Without becoming mired in the endless debate over whether society is truly
better off by focusing on certain environmental outcomes or numerical
indices, the more interesting question is this: Are the environmental
postmodernists doing anything different from the economists they criticize?
Consider Sinden’s proposal to vest environmental interests with
“absolute” rights under the ESA. I do not quarrel with Sinden on the
importance of the ESA. Nor do I quarrel with her thesis that predictable
political failures warrant strong provisions, such as those in the ESA
(although substantial literature shows how absolute provisions in the ESA
are administratively evaded218). But how is such a thesis to be made into
generally applicable policy, or even a guiding principle for environmental
law? What rights ought to qualify as “absolute”? Taking just one of the
requires environmental interests to prevail except in extraordinary circumstances—is just the kind of
thumb on the scale that is needed.”).
212. Amy Sinden, Climate Change and Human Rights, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
255 (2007) [hereinafter Sinden, Climate Change].
213. Id. at 257–58.
214. See id. at 258 (citing a case filed by the Inuit people against the United States in the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights and a lawsuit in a Nigerian court on flaring against Shell Oil).
215. Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, supra note 49, at 2068.
216. Id. at 2068, 2070.
217. Id. at 2064–65.
218. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, While the Cat’s Asleep The Making of the “New” ESA, 12 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 187 (1998); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game-theoretic Approach to Regulatory Negotiation
and an Empirical Framework for Analysis, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 33 (2002); David A. Dana, The
New “Contractarian” Paradigm in Environmental Law. 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 39 (2000).
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more obvious problems with an absolutist approach, what happens when
there are environmental interests on both sides of a question? In light of the
seriousness of climate change, should renewable energy sources be
privileged in violating the ESA and other wildlife statutes?219
These are dauntingly complex questions. Is it an accident that making
these kinds of determinations is intractable in a way that would inevitably
draw in environmental lawyers? Who would be equipped to weigh in on
determinations of what is “absolute,” an “environmental interest,” or a
“human right”? An argument that appears to have self-preservation as its
purpose need not be conscious rent-seeking; specialized professional
training in a particular field or way of thinking inevitably imbues the
professional with a heightened appreciation of her field and a relative lack
of appreciation for alternative ways of thinking. But if economics is
indeterminate and incoherent, what is one to do with the human rights focus
that environmental postmodernists have given us?
The point of this exercise is not to expose environmental postmodern
approaches as folly. There is much to agree with them. The point is to bring
to the fore assumptions underlying the environmental postmodernist
arguments and illustrate how they fail to grapple with the fundamental
epistemological differences between reformers and environmental
postmodernists. Environmental postmodernists are offering a different kind
of information and a different way of knowing. But it is as presumptuous to
privilege the postmodernists’ way of knowing as it is to make CBA a
privileged science. Environmental postmodernists argue that CBA has
become privileged and seek to dislodge it from its mantle. But they seek to
replace it with an approach which is equally indeterminate and,
coincidentally, one in which they have the unique skills to drive decision
making.
At bottom, the flaw with environmental postmodernists’ objection to
CBA is, in a sense, hypocritical: It implicitly presumes a discourse that is,
in their view, superior to CBA. That is the very objection that
environmental postmodernists levy against economists and CBA. Settling
this disagreement cannot be accomplished by resorting to logic. That would
privilege logic over CBA and other approaches. Environmental
postmodernists do not offer a principled way to determine whether CBA
does a better job of promoting environmental protection, or even economic
efficiency, than their proffered alternatives.
219. For example, promotion of wind energy has some environmental organizations concerned
because of the potential for wind turbines to kill birds. Dan Frosch, A Struggle to Balance Wind Energy
With Wildlife, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/science/earth/astruggle-to-balance-wind-energy-with-wildlife.html.
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B. The Relativity of Wrong
Postmodernism has also historically stumbled by failing to distinguish
from among levels of correctness or incorrectness. For postmodernists, it
seems, if truth cannot be absolute, then it can be nothing except a means for
a power grab.220 But even casual consumers of science can appreciate that
some physical laws can be more right than others. Science fiction writer
Isaac Asimov once wrote of this “relativity of wrong[ness]”:
[W]hen people thought the Earth was flat, they were wrong.
When people thought the Earth was spherical, they were wrong.
But if you think that thinking the Earth is spherical is just as
wrong as thinking the Earth is flat, then your view is wronger
than both of them put together.221

The nature of progress in physical, life, and social sciences is such that
we tolerate imperfect states of knowledge as necessary in order to have
progress. Moving the goalposts is thus part of the game, as any research,
discourse, and progress must take place in a context where there is a
conventional truth worth challenging and, eventually, rejecting. The nature
of progress is the accumulation of these rejected theories that narrow the
inquiry to increasingly more likely or more powerful explanations.222
Where postmodernists have fallen down is in their insistence that
everything with a grain of untruth be swept into the bloated category of
“wrong.”
This postmodernist slippery slope intolerance is most marked among
climate skeptics. For some in this community, climate science is just too
arbitrary and constructed to be considered “science.”223 Fundamentally, it is
220. See, e.g., SLINGERLAND, supra note 40, at 99–100 (discussing the paradox for the
postmodernist that is hard facts); BUTLER, supra note 20, at 56 (“What postmodern theory helps us to
see is that we are all constituted in a broad range of subject positions, through which we move with
more or less ease, so that all of us are combinations of class, race, ethnic, regional, generational, sexual,
and gender positions.”).
ASIMOV,
THE
RELATIVITY
OF
WRONG
(1988),
available
at
221. ISAAC
http://hermiene.net/essays-trans/relativity_of_wrong.html.
222. As Michael Shermer explains, Asimov’s view is that science is both “cumulative and
progressive.” Michael Shermer, Wronger Than Wrong, SCI. AM., Nov. 2006, at 40, 40. Even if we are
always in some sense, “wrong,” progress is the attenuation of our wrongness by rejecting imprecise
theories in favor of more precise ones. Id. But see, Kuhn, supra note 179, at 8 (arguing that governing
paradigms are social constructions, and that a paradigm shift only occurs when a new theory becomes
accepted by a sufficient fraction of the governing community). Not surprisingly, postmodernist scholar
Richard Rorty has called Kuhn’s book “the most influential English-language philosophy book of the
last half-century.” Richard Rorty, Untruth and Consequences, NEW REPUBLIC, July 31, 1995, at 32, 33.
223. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
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difficult to dispose of the uncontroversial fact that the Earth as a system is
retaining more solar energy.224 Even with near-unanimity among climate
scientists that climate change poses present and future risks ranging from
damaging to catastrophic change,225 climate skeptics insist that climate
science is just plain garbage.226 This is the rebirth of the postmodernist
proclivity to point to a few imprecisions as reason to doubt the knowability
of anything.
C. Environmental Postmodernism Reformed?
Even if postmodernism fails to provide guidance for solving
environmental problems, it flags a disturbing tendency. Uncertainty and
discord create difficult and complex decisions, and the resulting temptation
is to avoid a straight-on political resolution by seeking out an umpire. The
intractability of environmental problems cries out for some way of
refereeing our deep-seated differences. But postmodernist or not, there is
something troublingly convenient about delegating a difficult and important
decision to others—economists or scientists, or a process or institution that
claims expertise or objectivity, or both. It is as if exasperation with our
inability to settle disagreements creates a vacuum of authority that, at least
under the postmodernist account, invites abuse of power.
If postmodernism is to be useful at all, its essential skepticism must be
harnessed so that its logical endpoint is something other than an utterly
helpless nihilism. Is there ever an alternative to just accepting that some
disagreements can never be settled? Most postmodernists would probably
say yes, but then be confounded by their reflexive skepticism toward any
affirmative proposal on the grounds that it is a hidden power grab.227
Postmodernism has clashed with physics, psychology, biology, legal
positivism, climate science, and a wide variety of other metanarratives.
Indeed, any singular substantive approach must have a theory, a theory
224. James Hansen et al., Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change” Required Reduction of
Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations, and Nature, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2013, at
2–4, available at http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0081648.
225. William R.L. Anderegg et al., Expert Credibility in Climate Change, 107 PROC. NAT’L.
ACAD. SCI. 12107, 12107 (2010); Peter T. Doran & Maggie K. Zimmerman, Examining the Scientific
Consensus on Climate Change, 90 EOS 22, 22–23 (2009); Naomi Oreskes, Beyond the Ivory Tower The
Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCIENCE 1686, 1686 (2004).
226. See, e.g., supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text.
227. ROSENAU, supra note 25, at 131 (quoting Robert Cooper & Gibson Burrell, Modernism,
Postmodernism and Organizational Analysis An Introduction, 9 ORG. STUD. 91, 110 (1988)) (“Reason
and rationality are presumed to disguise power relations in the field of planning and organization
studies. Post-modernism ‘reveals formal organization to be the ever-present expression of an
autonomous power that masquerades as the supposedly rational constructions of modern institutions.’”).
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requires a metanarrative and a discipline, and a discipline requires esoteric
knowledge; along with esoteric knowledge comes power. Could
postmodernists ever be for anything?
There is at least one class of policy measures that postmodernists could
in principle support, and environmental postmodernism may provide a clue.
Some environmental postmodernists have proposed measures to increase
the transparency of environmental decision making.228 Measures to broaden
process inputs and increase transparency are the only kinds of affirmative
measures that a postmodernist could ever coherently favor. The
fundamental postmodern complaint is, after all, about the sly consolidation
of power. If a measure could only broaden access to information, then it
would tend to be power dissipating, rather than power consolidating. In
fact, taking post-structuralist postmodernism to its logical conclusion—that
there is no singular, correct, universal truth—the only permissible way of
deciding anything is to maximize the amount of public participation and
make publicly available all of the information available about a decision.
Transparency makes things like crowdsourcing possible, and this kind of
referendum by public access to information is the only possible way
forward for a postmodernist.
Along those lines, environmental postmodernists have put forward
suggestions. Lisa Heinzerling, as one of three editors of a volume of essays,
Reforming Regulatory Impact Analysis,229 endorsed a number of
recommended changes to CBA practice in regulatory impact analyses,
including: analysis of meaningful alternatives;230 adherence to a “checklist”
of good practices;231 comprehensibility to lay audiences, including the
adoption of “plain English” standards;232 a statement of consequences of
agency actions;233 equal application of CBA to deregulation as well as
regulation decisions;234 and consideration of distributional consequences.235
This is Heinzerling in her less postmodernist mode, consorting with a body
of economists very closely tied to CBAs—the widely respected think tank
Resources for the Future. This is also environmental postmodernism
tapping into one of the environmental movement’s best policy ideas:

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Harrington, Heinzerling & Morgenstern, supra note 103, at 221.
Id.
Id. at 221–22.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 226–27.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 230–31.
Id. at 232.
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opening up government decision making to public scrutiny.236 The National
Environmental Policy Act,237 which ushered in a worldwide wave of
environmental assessment legislation,238 requires nothing substantive, but
does require an environmental impact statement that sets out the
environmental consequences of a federal decision.239 Public participation
has always been a hallmark of the environmental movement.240
McGarity and Wagner suggest some ways to improve legal
engagement with science. For example, they propose a mandatory conflict
disclosure for scientific information or critiques that are submitted to courts
and regulators.241 Such disclosures would detail the influence that sponsors
had on the study.242 Conflict of interest disclosures have become
commonplace in a growing number of contexts,243 so it does not seem
unreasonable or overly burdensome to require them whenever scientific
information has the potential to influence regulators or courts. McGarity
and Wagner also propose data-sharing requirements for scientific research
that serve as an input to policy-making or court decisions, even when they
are privately funded.244 Since the universality of science is based in large
part on its replicability, requiring data access would not be particularly
intrusive. In CBA, there is clearly room for improvement. Environmental
postmodernists would do well to push for them, particularly those oriented
towards greater transparency, such as plain English requirements.
Climate change excites strong emotions, and hearing out climate
skeptics that have carried out scurrilous attacks might be painful. Judith
Curry is an atmospheric scientist whose work on hurricanes and climate
change245 is respected by mainstream climate scientists, and who is also
236. See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) (establishing that federal
agencies shall prepare an environmental impact statement for all proposed “major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” and make the statement available to the
public).
237. Id. §§ 4321–47.
238. ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 857 (6th ed. 2009) (noting that
following passage of the National Environmental Policy Act, over 80 countries have adopted similar
legislation).
239. Id. at 858–59.
240. See HAYS, A HISTORY, supra note 45, at 194 (“If there was any one effort that ran through
organized environmental affairs, it was the drive to persuade more people to become a part of the citizen
environmental ‘movement.’”).
241. MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 132, at 236.
242. Id. at 237.
243. Id. In fact, McGarity and Wagner propose that universities require conflict of interest
disclosures, something that most major research universities already do. Id.
244. Id. at 244.
245. See, e.g., Peter J. Webster, G. J. Holland, Judith A. Curry & Hai-Ru Chang, Changes in
Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration and Intensity in a Warming Environment, 309 SCIENCE 1844, 1844
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praised by climate skeptics for her willingness to engage with their
skepticism.246 Curry concedes that among climate skeptics there is “a lot of
crankology out there.”247 But scattered amongst the vast detritus of climate
crankology are nuggets of legitimate suggestions. Economist and climate
skeptic Ross McKitrick has written a paper suggesting a carbon tax that is
indexed to the global mean temperature.248 If the global mean temperature
rises, then the carbon tax would go up, the idea being that nature is the
“referee” of the climate debate.249 The IPCC (of which Curry is quite
critical250) has been the target of much criticism, but also suggested
reforms. Some have suggested embedding certain non-scientists into the
IPCC evaluation process, including journalists,251 mathematicians,
statisticians, and others.252 McKitrick has suggested IPCC reforms that
smack of environmental postmodernism: create a more open process for
selecting lead authors253 (who necessarily wield a considerable amount of
editorial power), diversify the range of disciplines so that more than just
climate scientists are involved,254 and create a more transparent contributing
author process.255 By themselves, it is hard to see why these reforms would
be controversial.
The postmodern condition in environmental law is rooted in
skepticism. In some part, increasingly partisan politics plays a role in the
disintegration of trust in environmental policy. If postmodernism is to have
a function, it is to challenge the universality of metanarratives. The role of
environmental postmodernism is to challenge the universality of asserted
premises that are influencing the development of environmental law. But

(Sept. 16, 2005); Judith A. Curry et al., Mixing Politics and Science in Testing the Hypothesis that
Greenhouse Warming is Causing a Global Increase in Hurricane Intensity, 87 BULL. AM.
METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 1025, 1032 (2006).
246. Michael D. Lemonick, Climate Heretic Judith Curry Turns on Her Colleagues, SCI. AM.,
Nov. 2010, available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=climate-heretic.
247. Id.
248. Ross McKitrick, A Simple State-Contingent Pricing Rule for Complex Intertemporal
Externalities, 33 ENERGY ECON. 111, 118–19 (2011). This idea has served as the inspiration for my own
work on the idea of prediction markets for climate outcomes. See Shi-Ling Hsu, A Prediction Market for
Climate Outcomes, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 179 (2011).
249. John Tierney, Trusting Nature as the Climate Referee, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/science/15tier.html.
250. Lemonick, supra note 244.
251. See David Adam & Suzanne Goldberg, How to Reform the IPCC, THE GUARDIAN (Feb.
10, 2010), available at http://environmentalresearchweb.org/cws/article/opinion/41760.
252. See ROSS MCKITRICK, GLOBAL WARMING POLICY FOUND., WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE
IPCC? PROPOSALS FOR A RADICAL REFORM 39 (2011) [hereinafter MCKITRICK, IPCC].
253. Id. at 4.
254. Id. at 39.
255. Id. at 38.
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rather than just agitating, the best way forward for environmental
postmodernists is to focus agitation on the one thing that should be noncontroversial: the reasonable expansion of process and the increased
transparency of decision making.
Lest we forget, today’s postmodernism, if successful, can be the target
of tomorrow’s postmodernist attacks. Postmodernists, of course, have their
ideologies; it would be naïve to believe that postmodernists are processobsessed saints. Among the proposals by McGarity and Wagner to open up
policy-relevant science are proposals aimed at the deregulatory ideology
they are more afraid of. They propose, for example, that people who lodge
misconduct charges against scientists should be required to disclose
“financial or ideological” interests in the outcome of challenged
research.256 Using almost exactly the same words, McKitrick proposes that
IPCC lead authors be required to disclose their “intellectual conflicts of
interest,” meaning their connections to “environmental activist
organizations.”257 It is not clear if any of the environmental postmodernists
actually see that their own proposals might lash back upon the scientists
that they support.
CONCLUSION
Environmental law is an area of public policy with ideal conditions for
postmodern objection. Uncertainties inherent in environmental issues
incubate disagreement. Environmental issues also excite emotions
stemming from bitterly competing worldviews of the role of industrial
wealth-generation.258 Given the messy, value-laden disagreements that
seem to confront antagonists in every environmental conflict, there is a
natural temptation to seek out a referee. Referees may hold esoteric
information about the environmental issues, and this produces an
information asymmetry that produces power.
Postmodernists have seized on this dynamic before but have stumbled.
Three principal problems have plagued traditional, twentieth-century,
French post-structuralists: They have failed to appreciate the relativity of
wrongness; they have failed to comprehend the nature of scientific inquiry;
and they have generally failed to articulate a positive vision to accompany
256. MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 132, at 280.
257. MCKITRICK, IPCC, supra note 252, at 5.
258. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection An
Experimental Study, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407, 407 (2013) (describing how people with
different worldviews can vary in their opinions regarding global warming and nuclear waste disposal);
Shi-Ling Hsu, A Conservative Approach to Environmental Law Be Data-Driven, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 281, 281 (2013) (discussing how political self-identification affects views on climate change).
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their reflexive skepticism. For these reasons, postmodernism has probably
run its course as a coherent body of thought.
And yet, postmodernism did not arise out of nowhere, and
environmental postmodernism has clearly caught hold of some serious
problems with environmental law- and policy-making. Problems with CBA
cry out for greater scrutiny and the use of science in the policy-making
process must be better informed, more nuanced, and above all, more
skeptical. And although, in this author’s view, the vast majority of climate
scientists are justified in their conduct of climate science and in their policy
prescriptions, there is something unsatisfying about the typical explanation
of why the general public has not joined climate scientists in their alarm. It
is just too pat to say that climate skepticism is solely the result of merchants
of doubt259 and the Koch brothers. Climate skeptics are exploiting a fear, an
anxiety, or a discomfort that climate scientists and climate policy advocates
have insufficiently addressed. All of these phenomena are metanarratives
that require something beyond top-down communication. For any policy
issue with large-scale consequences, and for anything that looks like a
metanarrative purporting to handily address the issue, some skepticism is
warranted. For policy advocates, a plausible ground game is needed to
reach a broader constituency than just a group of policy cognoscenti, to
avoid even the appearance of a power grab.
Environmental postmodernists have suffered some of the same pitfalls
that have befallen their French, post-structuralist forerunners. They have
sometimes failed to appreciate that there is a relativity of wrongness and
that progress depends on incremental discoveries that do not necessarily
deliver certainty. While there have been leaps in knowledge and widespread
acceptance, there are no eternal bedrocks of truth, not even in “hard”
sciences, such as physics. Newtonian mechanics gave way to Einstein’s
general theory of relativity,260 which is itself recognized to be
incomplete.261 But the nature of scientific inquiry is such that advances are
not permanent truths, but new reference points for discussion. The
environmental postmodernist’s mistake is to confuse criticism with
259. NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT, HOW A HANDFUL OF
SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 222–23,
258–59 (2010).
260. ALBERT EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY: THE SPECIAL AND GENERAL THEORY 16–17, 130, 134–36
(Robert W. Lawson trans., 1920).
261. See, e.g., ROGER PENROSE, THE ROAD TO REALITY: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE LAWS OF
THE UNIVERSE 292 (2004) (“Yet [Einstein’s] notion of spacetime geometry does require some (local)
structure—over and above just that of a smooth manifold.”); id. at 850 (“But to take this position is to
part company with one of the very basic principles of Einstein’s theory, namely the principle of general
covariance.”).
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refutation. Climate skeptics have lost their tolerance for the back-and-forth
that has defined scientific progress for centuries, insisting instead that
climate science achieve a level of certainty that is impossible, especially for
such a complex undertaking. And when environmental postmodernists raise
objections to CBA, they sometimes fail to appreciate that CBA doesn’t
present a “right” answer, but a new reference point for discussion. The
relevant question is whether one approach adds epistemological value or
not. For both CBA critics and climate skeptics, a demand for greater
precision should be accompanied by a comparison with a proffered
alternative, and a demonstration as to why it is a superior approach.
To their credit, environmental postmodernists have sometimes done
exactly that. But a trap awaits. When making an affirmative proposal,
environmental postmodernists must avoid committing the same sin for
which they criticize reformers: trying to steer the terms of debate onto their
own turf. This is the case, for example, when CBA is criticized on the
grounds that economists don’t know how to resolve environmental
conflicts, but lawyers do. Responding to a power grab with a power grabback is not progress.
For a postmodernist, the only principled way forward is to broaden
public participation and knowledge. Virtually any substantive proposal will
confer power upon some group and will therefore be open to postmodern
objection. In such a world, neither economists nor lawyers should get to
decide; the only legitimate arbiter is the court of public opinion. What
remains is procedural reform that increases public access to the information
inputs to environmental decision making. It is possible to craft procedural
proposals that are so clearly aimed at expanding process and increasing
transparency, and so clearly power-diffusing that only the most crabbed
postmodernist would see it as a power grab. In an era of increasing internet
access, transparency measures become attainable. Serendipitously, this
procedural tack is reminiscent of one of environmentalism’s greatest
contributions: the introduction of environmental assessment statutes, which
have (at least in the United States) imposed minimal substantive obligations
but significant procedural obligations.262
Skepticism is warranted when economists arrive at the doorstep and
announce, “we’re from the Economics Department, and we’re here to
help.”263 But if there is something the academy has learned from its
262. See supra text accompanying notes 236–40.
263. “We’re from the government, and we’re here to help,” has become a lampoon widelyadopted by conservatives for when people feign helpfulness with a hidden purpose of instead exploiting
someone. See e.g., Jason Bedrick, “We’re From the Government and We’re Here to Help,” Schoolyard
Edition, CATO LIBERTY (Oct. 11, 2013, 11:16 AM), http://www.cato.org/blog/were-government-were-
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flirtation with postmodernism, it is that skepticism has to be accompanied
by something affirmative. What a brief encounter with environmental
postmodernism has illustrated is one form of that affirmative way forward:
procedural reform. If done with an open mind, it is a way out of the
nihilistic dystopia that has always been associated with postmodernism.

here-help-schoolyard-edition (describing unintended consequences of government programs against
bullying); Geoffrey Norman, We’re From the Government, and We’re Here to Help you Lose Weight,
WEEKLY STANDARD (June 26, 2012, 9:15 AM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/weregovernment-and-were-here-help-you-lose-weight_647856.html. The origin of the phrase derives from
President Ronald Reagan, who once quipped, “[t]he nine most terrifying words in the English language
are: ‘I’m from the government and I’m here to help.’” Daniel Kurtzman, Ronald Reagan Quotes,
ABOUT.COM, http://politicalhumor.about.com/cs/quotethis/a/reaganquotes.htm (last visited Nov. 23
2014).

